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ABSTRACT 
A CONTEMPORARY EXAMINATION OF THE MILES AND SNOW STRATEGIC 
TYPOLOGY THROUGH THE LENSES OF DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES AND 
AMBIDEXTERITY 
 
by 
Marc D. Sollosy 
 
This study’s focuses on the examination of the Miles and Snow typology through 
the lenses of dynamic capabilities with a particular emphasis on ambidexterity.  While 
each element of the typology has received varying degrees of study in both the 
management and marketing literature, to date, no study has examined the typology, as 
first proposed by Miles and Snow under the influence of either dynamic capabilities or 
ambidexterity.  This study proposes to examine the alignment of the three elements of the 
typology with each other and the four strategic archetypes identified by Miles and Snow.  
It was Hambrick’s observation in his 2003 commentary “On the staying power of 
defenders, analyzers and prospectors” that served as the impetus of this study.  From 
both a managerial and research perspective, the proposed study furthers the 
understanding of the strategic archetypes and important drivers of a sustained competitive 
advantage. 
The study of 503 diverse firms specifically finds that how an organization 
addresses it’s entrepreneurial, engineering, and administrative domains influences and 
helps to explain its resulting strategic archetype.  Additionally, the study supports the 
position that consistency matters.  Organizations that are consistent in their approach to 
the various domains outperform those whose approach is less consistent.  Contributing to 
the on-going discussion around strategy and structure, the results support the contention 
 vii 
 
that defining the business focus, or the entrepreneurial domain, is the primary 
determinant of the organization’s strategic archetype.  It further shows that the decisions 
regarding how, the engineering domain, impacts the business focus decision tempers the 
ultimate strategic archetype.  In general, the analysis demonstrates the enduring value of 
the Miles and Snow typology, and how the lenses of dynamic capabilities and 
ambidexterity further the explanatory power of the typology.  
 
 
Keywords: Miles and Snow, strategic orientation, resource based view (RBV), dynamic 
capabilities, adaptive capability, absorptive capability, innovative capability, 
ambidexterity, competitive advantage  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
Above average business performance is a prerequisite for an organization to 
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage.  Such performance requires an organization 
to develop dynamic capabilities that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable in 
support of their business strategy (Barney, 1991).  Many authors have presented theories 
and models examining and explaining how organizations go about achieving a 
sustainable competitive advantage.  Over the last three decades, the strategic typology 
posited by Miles and Snow (1978) has received wide spread general acceptance within 
the fields of strategic management and organizational theory (Hambrick, 2003).  The 
typology’s longevity and brilliance is attributed to its innate parsimony, industry-
independent nature, and that it corresponds with the actual strategic positioning of firms 
across a multitude of industries and countries (Hambrick, 2003).  Their typology has 
important implications for managers and scholars alike because it appears to well 
represent the generic approaches to business strategy.  This widely embraced typology 
has been the subject of extensive research attention in both the management and 
marketing strategic literature, as shown in the following table. 
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Table 1:  Major Studies of the Miles and Snow Typology 
Authors Focus of the research 
Conant, Mokawa, and Varadarajan 
(1990) 
Develops a multi-item scale operationalizing 
the Miles and Snow strategic typology.  
Studies the relationship between strategic 
types, distinctive marketing competencies, and 
organizational performance. 
Hambrick (1983) 
 
Tests and extends the Miles and Snow 
typology by exploring the effectiveness of 
strategic types in different environments.  
Additionally, examines the differences in the 
attributes of Defenders and Prospectors. 
McDaniel and Kolari (1987) 
 
 
Examines the typology as it relates to the field 
of marketing strategy.  Their results provide 
support for the applicability of the typology to 
the area of marketing strategy. 
McKee, Varadarajan and Pride (1989) 
 
Examines the effectiveness of the Miles and 
Snow strategic typology within the frame of 
dynamic markets and volatility. 
Ruekert and Walker (1987) 
  
Examines the extent of interdepartmental 
conflict and the structures used to manage and 
resolve conflict between marketing and R&D. 
Shortell and Zajac (1990) 
 
Examines the reliability and validity of various 
measures utilized to develop the archetypes of 
the Miles and Snow typology. 
Di Benedetto and Song (2003) 
 
  
Examines the importance of different bundles 
of firm-level capabilities relative to the 
different archetypes of the Miles and Snow 
strategic types. 
DeSarbo, Di Benedetto, Song and 
Sinha (2005) 
 
(Desarbo et al., 2005) 
Utilizes a quantitative typology to examine the 
differences in strategic capabilities, 
performance and environmental factors as they 
relate to the Miles and Snow strategic types. 
DeSabro, Di Benedetto, Jedidi and 
Song (2006) 
 
Utilizes a constrained latent structure structural 
equation based method to empirically estimate 
an ‘optimal” typology.  They derive a four 
mixed-type solution that improves upon the 
Miles and Snow typology in terms of statistical 
fit. 
 
The Miles and Snow model subjectively classifies organizations, based on their 
patterns of strategic decisions, into four categories: Prospector, Analyzer, Defender, and 
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Reactor (DeSarbo et al., 2006).  Miles and Snow (1978) posited that three of the four 
identified strategic archetypes; Prospector, Analyzer, and Defender, should perform well, 
and should outperform the fourth type, Reactor, due to its lack of a consistent strategy 
(2005).  The typology as posited by Miles and Snow (1978) presents strategy as a 
collection of decisions, including capability orientations, utilized by the business unit to 
align its management processes with its environment.  Principle among these capabilities 
is the organization’s orientation towards:  selecting and adjusting its product-market 
domain, what Miles and Snow identified as the entrepreneurial problem; how the 
organization goes about producing and delivering its products and services, the 
engineering problem; and how the organization establishes roles, relationships and 
organizational processes, the administrative problem.  Figure 1 presents the cyclical 
relationship between these capabilities. 
 
Figure 1:  Capabilities Relationship 
 
The 
Entrepreneurial 
Problem 
Choice of 
Product-Market 
Domain 
The Engineering 
Problem 
 
Choice regarding 
technologies and 
processes for 
production and 
distribution 
The 
Administrative 
Problem 
 
Roles, 
relationships 
and 
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In their classic study, Miles and Snow (1978) categorize organizations as 
Prospectors, Analyzers, Defenders and Reactors based upon their approach in addressing 
the aforementioned identified capabilities.  Additionally, they posit that the first three 
archetypes, Prospectors, Analyzers, and Defenders, will opt for different strategic 
approaches.  Prospectors tend to be more innovative and seek out new markets, 
Analyzers are followers in that they opt for a “second-but-better” strategy, and Defenders 
usually remain focused on maintaining a secure niche in a relatively stable product or 
service area.  Reactors, on the other hand, respond inconsistently to challenges, with a 
short-term orientation driven by environmental dependence.  Miles and Snow (1978) 
further posit that each of the first three archetypes can be successful if the organization 
matches its strategy to the competitive environment, and develops and deploys the 
appropriate capabilities, while Reactors will tend to be the least successful due to their 
apparent inability to align their strategy with the competitive environment. 
Capabilities entail “complex bundles of skills and accumulated knowledge that 
enable firms to coordinate activities and make use of their assets” (Day, 1990 p. 38).  Day 
(1994 p. 40) further suggests, “It is not possible to enumerate all possible capabilities, 
because every business develops its own configuration of capabilities that is rooted in the 
realities of its competitive market, past commitments, and anticipated requirements”.  
According to the resource-based view (RBV), (Barney, 1986b; 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) 
firms deploy these capabilities and their resources strategically.   
The manner by which these distinct capabilities are exploited may well allow for 
the creation of a sustainable competitive advantage.  However, many scholars (e.g., 
Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) suggest that distinct capabilities are not sufficient unto 
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themselves.  That organizations need to “integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and 
external capabilities to address rapidly changing environments” (p. 516).  As such, the 
capabilities themselves may help the organization perform better, but the performance is 
further improved by those organizations that have the ability to put their capabilities to 
the best use.  Hitt and Ireland (1985) suggest that organizations that best develop and 
manage their resources and capabilities will outperform their competition over time.   
Research in the sphere of dynamic capabilities, an evolutionary extension of the 
RBV, stress utilizing organization specific capabilities to address changing environments 
(Teece et al., 1997).  Dynamic capabilities emphasize developing management 
capabilities, and inimitable combinations of organizational, functional and technical 
skills. Dynamic capabilities extend the RBV perspective in two ways; first, the dynamic 
aspect refers to an organization’s ability to renew competencies or capabilities to keep 
pace with changing business environments.  This renewal often requires innovative 
responses when time-to-market and timing are critical elements, when the rate of 
technological change is rapid or accelerating, and when the nature of future markets and 
competition is uncertain.  Second, capabilities emphasizes the role of strategic 
management in appropriately adapting, integrating and reconfiguring both internal and 
external organizational skills, resources and function to match the requirements of a 
changing environment (Teece et al., 1997).   
Dynamic capabilities recognize that organizations need to both adapt and create 
new competencies and capabilities to be competitive.  The ambidextrous orientation is an 
extension of dynamic capabilities and explicitly requires an organization to be capable of 
both exploiting existing (internal) competencies, as well as exploring new (external) 
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opportunities.  March (1991) argued that the two concepts of exploitation and exploration 
should be viewed as dichotomous ends on a single continuum.  Others characterize 
exploration and exploitation as independent activities, orthogonal to each other.  In this 
view, organizations can choose to engage in high levels of both learning activities 
simultaneously (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006).  Consistent with this latter view, this 
paper considers ambidexterity as the capacity of an organization to pursue high levels of 
exploration and exploitation concurrently, as opposed to managing trade-offs in an 
attempt to find the most appropriate balance between them (Cao, Gedajlovic, & Zhang, 
2009). 
In his academic commentary on the staying power of the Defender, Analyzer, and 
Prospector, Hambrick (2003 p.118) suggests “a third [research] opportunity is to address 
the practical challenges of pursuing the most complicated of Miles and Snow’s strategic 
types: the Analyzer.” He then goes on to “pity” top managers in an Analyzer organization 
because “they are walking a tightrope, trying to be innovative at the same time they are 
trying to be efficient and reliable” (Hambrick, p. 118).  The ability of an organization to 
manage this apparent paradox is the essence of organizational ambidexterity (Duncan, 
1976).  Organizations need the ability to generate new knowledge in support of new 
products and services while simultaneously leveraging current competencies in the 
exploitation of existing products and services (Danneels, 2002).  Tushman and O’Reilly 
(1996) posit that in order for an organization to survive and prosper, it must excel at both 
exploration and exploitation. 
Miles and Snow (1978) identify operating characteristics of the strategic 
archetypes in terms of their entrepreneurial, engineering (operational), and administrative 
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capabilities and approach.  Subsequent studies (e.g. Benedetto and Song, 2003; Conant et 
al., 1990; DeSarbo et al., 2005; DeSarbo et al., 2006; Hambrick, 1983) have examined 
the archetypes through a variety of different lenses.  Significantly, dynamic capabilities, 
particularly with an emphasis on ambidexterity, have not been utilized as the foundation 
to any study of the typology.    
This study examines the relationship between an organization’s dynamic 
capabilities and ambidextrous orientation and resulting strategic type, as identified in the 
Miles and Snow typology (1978).  Utilizing the organizational ambidexterity orientation 
and dynamic capabilities literature, I develop hypotheses examining the relationships 
between the Miles and Snow strategic types and an organization’s ambidextrous 
orientation.  There is little, to no, extant literature examining the Miles and Snow (1978) 
typology utilizing the lens of dynamic capabilities, with specific emphasis on 
ambidexterity.  This gap ignores how the typology continues to maintain its relevance 
thirty years after Miles and Snow first postulated it.  This research spans the gap by 
demonstrating in a unique way how dynamic capabilities and ambidexterity relate and 
support the typology in a parsimonious manner.  This contemporary angle is of particular 
relevance given that the typology provides a fulcrum for examining a variety of strategic 
and operational orientations (Miles & Snow, 2003). 
Due to the vintage of the original work by Miles and Snow (1978), many scholars 
and managers believe that the ideas expressed by them are for an earlier, some may even 
suggest, simpler time.  This study demonstrates that not only does the typology continue 
to be relevant, but when viewed through the lens of ambidextrous dynamic capabilities, 
brings clarity to the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary strategic 
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management.  The Miles and Snow typology addresses many of the fundamental strategic 
and organizational trade-offs today’s organizations must make in order to attain some 
level of competitive advantage.  The elegance of the typology lies in the simplicity of its 
characterizations, such that its explanatory power transcends the academic world and is 
equally comprehensible to the practitioner. As a result, it may well assist the practitioner 
in understanding the interaction of the variables necessary to achieve the more elusive 
sustainable competitive advantage.     
Two of the strategic archetypes, Prospector and Defender, have been examined 
extensively in the literature (e.g., Hambrick, 1983; McDaniel & Kolari, 1987; Meyer, 
1982; Miles et al., 1978; Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980), principally because they are the most 
recognizable and thus the easiest to explain and understand.  The remaining two types, 
Analyzer and Reactor, have received far less attention.  The apparent lack of focus on the 
Analyzer archetype is perhaps attributable to its complexity (Hambrick, 2003).  This lack 
of focus is further likely accredited to not applying a focal lens that can clarify the 
attributes of this archetype.  The Reactor’s seemingly erratic behavior presents an entirely 
different challenge, that being the equivalent of trying to capture smoke in a bottle. How 
does one explain something that is difficult to grasp and has no consistent form? 
Utilizing the lens of ambidexterity, this study brings focal clarity to the 
understanding of the Miles and Snow archetypes.  It is argued that utilizing the 
ambidexterity lens, within the context of dynamic capabilities, provides a continuum for 
both classifying and understanding the attributes of these archetypes.  The Prospector, 
Defender and even Reactor are archetypes that are understood.  The strategic orientation 
and attributes of both the Prospector and Defender are easily identifiable and remain 
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consistent over time, and the Reactor is identifiable by virtue of its apparent lack of 
consistency or clearly recognizable orientation (Miles & Snow, 1978).   
While this study examines the four archetypes, it is increasing the understanding 
of the Analyzer archetype that may prove the most enlightening.  The Analyzer appears 
as an enigma.  The Analyzer’s duel focus presents a conundrum whereby at times it may 
appear as a Prospector and at others as a Defender.  The Analyzer archetype, because of 
its apparent conflict of attentions, makes it difficult to neatly identify and understand.  
However, when the lens of ambidexterity is applied, a much clearer and cohesive picture 
emerges.  In fact, it is argued that the Analyzer is a proxy for the ambidextrous 
organization. 
While each of the Miles and Snow (1978) archetypes has a place in its respective 
environment, the Analyzer, because of its more adaptive orientation, may well be a model 
for sustainable advantage in the increasingly evolving competitive climate.  The Analyzer 
is an archetype that more organizations increasingly approximate, or intend to 
approximate (Hambrick, 2003).  By increasing the understanding and assimilation of the 
characteristics of the Analyzer, an organization may well improve its basis for achieving 
a competitive advantage and access to increased rents in the market. In summary, this 
research contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: 
 First, it takes a contemporary look at the work of Miles and Snow (1978).  
It presents the view that even 35 years after the work was first presented, 
the typology is still a relevant and useful model for understanding an 
organization’s strategic orientation. 
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 Second, by applying the lenses of dynamic capabilities and ambidexterity, 
this study extends the original work by Miles and Snow (1978). 
 Third, this study demonstrates that while the original work by Miles and 
Snow (1978) presents the four strategic archetypes as static and mutually 
exclusive immutable states; when viewed through the lens of dynamic 
capabilities, they are better viewed as various phases along a changing 
dynamic.  That is, as an organization reconfigures and deploys its 
resources in response to changes in its environment; it will reposition itself 
among the strategic archetypes.  When the focal lens of ambidexterity is 
added, it becomes apparent that an organization can, and often does 
coexist simultaneously in more than one strategic archetype. 
 Finally, the study develops a clearer understanding of how the three 
problem domains (entrepreneurial, engineering and administrative) 
identified by Miles and Snow (1978) align and interact in influencing and 
positioning an organization’s strategic archetype. 
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Strategic Typologies 
Ideally, a typology of organizational strategic deployment should account for 
heterogeneity among organizations with respect to their individual capabilities, 
effectiveness of their exploration and exploitation, and their resulting performance.  
Several environmental factors such as intensified international competition, sluggish 
economic growth, technological advancements and deregulation provide an impetus for 
strategic management (Day & Wensley, 1988; Jain, 1985).  Typologies in strategic 
management are common and widely utilized to describe feasible business strategies in 
industry.  Some examples of typologies in the realm of strategic management relate to; 
strategic context (Mintzberg, 1978), views on strategy (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994), 
strategic decision making types (Ansoff, 1965), or strategic behavior patterns (Miles and 
Snow, 1978). 
Muhammad and Ehsan (2011) suggest that the most influential typologies are 
probably those of Abell (1980), Miller (1992), Porter (1980a), Tearcy and Wiersema 
(1995) and Miles and Snow (1978).  Shortly after Miles and Snow published their 
strategy typology, Porter (1980b) presented his set of “generic strategies” and Abell 
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(1980) followed with his “strategic windows”.  Miller (1992) later presented his view in 
the form of “high performance gestalt”, with strategy consultants Treacy and Wiersema 
(1995) positing “market leadership” soon after.  Table 2 presents the prevalent strategic 
typologies.  
Table 2:  Prevalent Strategic Typologies 
Authors Categories or Types 
Miles and Snow (1978)   Prospectors 
 Analyzers 
 Defenders 
 Reactors 
Porter (1980a) – Generic 
Strategies 
 Cost Leadership 
 Differentiation 
 Focus 
Abell (1980) – Strategic 
Windows 
 New Primary Demand 
 New Competing Technology 
 Market Redefinition 
 Channel Changes 
Miller (1992) – High 
Performance Gestalt 
 Craftsman 
 Builder 
 Pioneer 
 Salesman 
Treacy and Wiersema (1995) – 
Market Leadership 
 Operational Excellence 
 Product Leadership 
 Customer Intimacy 
 
The principal difference among these influential typologies lie in that Miles and 
Snow, and subsequently Miller’s work take more of a ‘strategic choice’ approach 
focusing on both the analysis of an organization’s internal strengths and weaknesses, 
along with its external environment.  The internal aspects of this approach are extended 
by Barney (1986b; 1991) into the Resource Based View (RBV).  The work of Porter, 
Abell, and to a lesser degree, Treacy and Wiersema are more rooted in an external view, 
with a focus on analyses of opportunities and threats.  This industrial organizational 
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economist’s view examines the environment and seeks ways for allocating organizational 
resources through estimates of market demand, levels of output, and product price (Miles 
& Snow, 1978).   
Miles and Snow do not view the environment as a homogeneous entity, but rather 
as a complex combination of factors, including product and labor market conditions, 
industry customs, government regulation, as well as raw material and financial resource 
availability.  It is each of these factors and their unique influence on the organization that 
helps define the strategic type the organization will adopt.  Miles and Snow posit that an 
organization’s structure and approach is only partially pre-ordained by environmental 
conditions and that top management choices are the critical drivers of organizational 
structure and process.  Furthermore, while the potential available choices are many and 
complex, they fall into three broad areas of concern; the engineering, the entrepreneurial, 
and the administrative problems (Miles & Snow, 1978).   
To summarize, the key premise in the extant industrial organizational economic 
literature is that strategy should favorably align the organization with its environment 
(Andrews & David, 1971; Hofer, 1975; Porter, 1980a), as such, strategy is an adaptive 
mechanism, which conflicts with Miles and Snow’s (1978) view that strategy is relatively 
immutable.  They posit that strategy constrains the organization in its response to the 
environment.  Furthermore, over time, the organization develops reoccurring and tested 
guidelines or methods for responding to, or more importantly, ignoring environmental 
shifts (Hambrick, 1983).   
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) posit that strategies follow along a continuum from 
deliberate at one extreme to emergent at the other.  The authors further contend that 
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defining strategies as deliberate precludes any significant amount of organizational 
learning relative to its strategy.  In Hambrick’s (1983) view, Miles and Snow present 
their archetype strategic types as being a deliberate set of actions in response to the 
organization’s view of its environment.  The Miles and Snow typology positions 
Defenders as more deliberate in their orientation and thus inclined towards a planned 
strategy.  At the other end of the continuum is the Prospector with a tendency towards a 
more emergent strategy.  I posit that in this paradigm, the Analyzer resides somewhere 
between the two extremes.  Mintzberg and Waters (1985 p. 296) suggest “it may even be 
possible that highly deliberate strategy making processes will be found to drive 
organizations away from prospecting activities and towards cost leadership strategies 
whereas emergent ones may encourage the opposite posture”. 
The Miles and Snow (1978) typology is one of the most popular, in regards to 
strategic capabilities, in the literature.  Their typology has been extensively applied in 
both the management and marketing strategy literature since its inception.  Among the 
studies are the work of Hambrick (1983), Conant et al. (1990), Walker et al. (2003) and 
even after a quarter of a century the typology is considered a landmark conceptual model 
(Hambrick, 2003).   
Hambrick (1983 p. 6) suggests that the “key dimension underlying the [Miles and 
Snow] typology is the rate at which an organization changes its products or markets”.  
Hambrick (1983 p. 6) continues by identifying:  “Defenders are organizations that engage 
in little or no new product/market development.” “Prospectors attempt to pioneer 
product/market development.”  “Analyzers are an intermediate type.”  Finally, Hambrick 
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(1983 p. 7) addresses the Reactor as “Organizations that attempt ad hoc opportunistic 
deviations from their strategies, or never develop a strategy….” 
Miles and Snow’s presentation of their typology suggests that organizations 
develop internal consistencies in the pursuit of their strategy and that by extension, 
perpetuate behaviors associated with the strategy.  The result being that as the 
environment in which the organization operates changes; the organization has a tested 
and well developed set of responses for dealing with the change.  However, the reciprocal 
behavior, in the form of strategic inertia, may also result.  This is exhibited by the 
organizations difficulty in accepting the need for, or implementing strategic change 
(Hambrick, 1983). 
Expanding upon this view, Zahra and Pearce (1990 p. 751) present that 
"successful organizations develop a systematic, identifiable approach to environmental 
adaptation”.  The approach an organization takes relative to the competitive environment 
addresses three types of problems identified by Miles and Snow:  the entrepreneurial 
problem deals with determining an organization’s market-product domain; the 
engineering problem addressing an organization’s systems and capabilities; and the 
administrative problem focusing on organizational processes and strategic issues. 
Entrepreneurial Problem. The strategic archetypes posited by Miles and Snow 
differentiate themselves in how they address the entrepreneurial problem; defined as the 
strategic management of the organization’s approach to the product-market domain(s) 
they serve (Hambrick, 1983).  Defenders seek to create and maintain stability in their 
domain by aggressively protecting their product-markets.  While Miles and Snow present 
the Defender type as a single archetype, Slater, et al. (2010), leveraging Porter’s (1980a) 
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focus on differentiation and low cost as a means towards competitive advantage, presents 
two, related but different aspects, for the Defender; the Low Cost Defender and the 
Differentiated Defender.  The Low Cost Defender approaches their product-market 
domain with a feature/benefit mix that adequately addresses the domain’s needs.  As a 
result of focusing on achieving the lowest possible costs relative to production and 
distribution, this subtype differentiates itself by offering a lower, if not the lowest, overall 
price in markets viewed as mature and stable (Slater et al., 2010).  An organization 
exemplifying this approach is VIZIO, who in 2007 became the market share leader with 
low manufacturing costs, low price, good quality, low advertising, and an intense focus 
on its distribution strategy (Ogg & Kanellos, 2010; Slater et al., 2010).  The 
Differentiated Defender also operates in well established, mature domains.  However, 
they differentiate themselves from the Low Cost Defender by offering a superior product 
or service (or one that is perceived of as superior on some dimension) at a premium price. 
Slater at al. (2010 p. 471) offer Intuit as an example of the Differentiated Defender.  
Intuit is “best identified and respected for its Quicken, Quick Books, and TurboTax line 
of products”. 
The Prospector resides at the other extreme in its more proactive and aggressive 
approach to its environment.  Prospector type organizations seek not only to identify, but 
to exploit new opportunities through both product and market development.  A classic 
example of a Prospector organization is 3M.  Slater et al. (2010 p. 470) stated, “in 1916, 
3M invented Wetordry…  Other successful 3M discoveries include; masking tape, Scotch 
cellophane tape, the Thermo-Fax copying process, Scotchgard Fabric Protector, Post-it 
Notes and a variety of pharmaceutical products.”  As an organization, 3M is committed to 
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continuous innovation and new product development, serving customers through six 
business segments (3M). 
Analyzers appear to occupy a more central position by carefully exploring new 
product and market opportunities, while simultaneously maintaining their core skills, 
products and customers (Slater & Narver, 1993).  Analyzers often quickly follow 
Prospectors into new domains with incrementally improved products or services, or with 
low prices.  Slater et al. (2010 p. 475) suggest that Analyzers “target the early adopter 
and early majority segments with a creative strategy that enables the Analyzer to both 
steal early adopter customers from Prospectors and attract members of the early 
majority”.  Microsoft may be viewed as one of the most successful examples of the 
Analyzer archetype.  As Slater et al. (2010 p. 475) presents, “Microsoft has a very broad 
product line, with many of its best known products (e.g., DOS, Word, Excel, PowerPoint, 
Internet Explorer, X-Box) entering the market as second – or, even later – movers”.  The 
steady stream of revenue generated by these, and other similar products, has served as the 
catalyst in funding other company developments.  Slater et al. (2010 p. 475) “Microsoft 
expends considerable effort identifying emerging product-market opportunities that have 
been established by traditional market innovators [Prospectors] – such as Apple, Sony, 
and Nintendo – and then pursuing sales in the mainstream market.” 
Engineering Problem. Subsequent to addressing the entrepreneurial problem, the 
organization must then create a system for producing and distributing the products and 
services within the identified domain.  This is what Miles and Snow identify as the 
engineering problem.  This engineering problem involves the creation of systems and 
processes that operationalize the organization’s approach to the entrepreneurial problem.  
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The operationalizing of these systems and processes often requires the selection of 
appropriate technologies facilitating the input-transformation-output process for the 
production and distribution of the chosen products and services.  Additionally, the 
organization may need to establish new, or at a minimum modify existing, information, 
communication, and control channels to ensure the proper utilization of the technology 
(Miles & Snow, 2003). 
Administrative Problem. Overarching successful implementation of both the 
entrepreneurial and engineering problems is what Miles and Snow (1978) identify as the 
administrative problem.  In the view of many management theories, the administrative 
problem is primarily focused on the reduction of uncertainty within the organization.  
Miles and Snow (2003) conceptualized the administrative problem as rationalizing and 
stabilizing those activities which successfully solved the problems facing organizations 
during the entrepreneurial and engineering phases.  In their view, solving the 
administrative problem involves more than just rationalizing existing systems, what they 
posit as uncertainty reduction; it also entails formulating and implementing processes 
enabling the organization to continue to evolve, or innovate.  This is often exhibited by 
an organization’s ability to revamp many of their internal planning, coordination and 
control related activities such as to facilitate the organization’s ability to pursue new or 
emerging areas of business.  Additionally, these activities may encompass the addition of 
new personnel, new functions, and the like to the existing organization.  As a result, it is 
the development and implementation of these organizational structures and processes that 
ultimately support the organization’s entrepreneurial and engineering problems (Slater & 
Narver, 1993). 
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Miles and Snow (2003) assert that the ideal organization’s management should be 
equally adept at performing two somewhat conflicting functions.  First, the organization’s 
management should be able to create an administrative system, structure and set of 
processes that would smoothly direct and monitor the organization’s current activities.  
They would do so in a manner that would prevent the system from becoming so ingrained 
such as to jeopardize future innovative activities. 
The most complicated of the Miles and Snow’s strategic types to study as an 
academic and implement as a manager is the Analyzer.  The challenge for managers is 
how to adopt an Analyzer’s orientation without inadvertently falling in to the Reactor’s 
archetype.  The implantation of the Analyzer archetype requires careful and delicate 
balancing of often conflicting demands, from both internal and external stakeholders.  
Hambrick (2003) suggests that it is relatively easy and straight forward to explore the two 
extreme models; Prospector and Defender.  These types present a clear representation of 
what their focus is and what they are striving to be.  These organizations face decisions 
that are relatively easy to adopt, while those that do not fit with the strategic typology are 
easy to reject.  Granted, there is the risk that an organization pursuing one of these two 
orientations will become an exaggeration; a hyper-defender or a hyper-prospector, and as 
a result fail because of its exaggerated profile (Miller, 1992).  Barring that occurrence, 
organizations in each of those two domains can enjoy clarity, consistency, and nothing to 
“balance”.   
Hambrick (2003) argues that it is the Analyzer organizations that are walking a 
tightrope, trying to innovate while trying to remain efficient and reliable.  It is easy to 
view these organizations as vacillating and unsure. They don’t have the same clarity of 
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focus as Defenders and Prospectors.  Should they have subunits that look and behave like 
Defenders, while other aspects of the organization look like Prospectors?  Should they 
engage in temporary activities to make them appear as Prospectors and then swing back 
to the Defender direction, then back to the Prospector direction, and so on?  Or is it better 
for the organization to try to proceed down the middle, adopting moderate and hybrid 
approaches to everything the organization does?  Miles and Snow (1978) provide a 
template of what an Analyzer should look like, but stop short of expounding upon the 
administrative intricacies required within the duality of these organizations.  Vast 
majorities of organizations approximate, or intend to approximate, the Analyzer strategic 
type.  There are many managers in these organizations waiting for insights into how to 
successfully approach their organizations (Hambrick, 2003).  In this regard, examination 
of the solution(s) to the administrative problem provides insight as to how management 
can best address their organization. 
Resource-Based View (RBV) 
Foundational to any discussion of dynamic capabilities is the work of Barney 
(1986c; 1991) and Wernerfelt (1984; 1995) and the concepts of the resource-based view 
(RBV).  Key to any discussion of RBV is the VRIN framework.  As expressed by Barney 
(1991), in order for an organization to achieve any form of a sustained competitive 
advantage, the resources of the organization must be valuable (V), rare (R), inimitable (I), 
and non-substitutable (N).  Specifically, for a resource to be a sustained source of 
competitive advantage,  
“it [resources] must be valuable, in the sense that (a) it exploits 
opportunities and/or neutralizes threats in a firm’s environment, (b) it must 
be rare among a firm’s current and potential competition, (c) it must be 
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imperfectly imitable, and (d) there cannot be strategically equivalent 
substitutes for this resource that are valuable but neither rare or 
imperfectly imitable” (p. 105).  
In RBV, competitive advantage is examined from the perspective of the “distinct 
competencies” that provide an organization with an advantage over its competitors 
(Barney, 1986a; 1986c; Day & Wensley, 1988; Hitt et al., 2001; Reed & DeFillippi, 
1990).  Lado et al. (1992) suggest that the work of these, and other authors; Dierickx & 
Cool (1989) and Wernefelt (1984) to name a few, present the organization as a web of 
resources deployed with the aim of capturing a unique market position.  These works 
present the concept of sustained competitive advantage and extend it to the context of 
resource-based competencies.  As a result, this concept of a sustained competitive 
advantage is built upon the foundation that organization specific competencies provide 
the basis of rent-yielding strategic assets (Barney, 1986a; 1989; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). 
RBV differs from the neoclassical economics of Chamberlin (1950) and Friedman 
(1953) or the industrial organizational view popularized by Porter (1980a; 1980b; 1985) 
which views strategy as being a function of environmental determinism and views 
strategy as being a series of strategic selections and actions focused on organizational 
survival and renewal (Lado et al., 1992).  This concept of strategic selection provides a 
framework for recognizing that idiosyncratic competencies and capabilities are 
consciously created and developed by organizations.  Contrary to the industrial 
organizational view ascribing competitive advantage to the dictates of the market / 
industry, RBV places emphasis on distinctive competencies as the source of sustainable 
competitive advantage.   The RBV defines capabilities as bundles of skills and 
knowledge that allow an organization to make the best use of their assets and to 
effectively coordinate their activities (Day, 1990).   Furthermore, RBV posits that such 
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competencies are proactively created and sustained through the pattern of strategic 
decisions and actions taken by the organization (Lado et al., 1992).  Capabilities refer to 
an organization’s capacity to deploy resources, usually in combination, and encapsulate 
both those explicit processes and tacit elements, such as know-how and leadership, 
embedded in the processes.  As such, capabilities are most likely organizational specific 
and develop over time through complex interactions between and among the 
organization’s resources (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993).   
Wang and Ahmed (2007) present organizational resources and capabilities in a 
‘hierarchical’ order, with a focus on an organization’s competitive advantage.  They posit 
that resources are the foundation of an organization and thus the basis for organizational 
capabilities.  They designate resources as the ‘zero-order’ element of their hierarchy.  
While resources can be a source of temporary competitive advantage, in dynamic market 
environments they tend not to persist over time and thus, cannot be a source of a 
sustainable competitive advantage.  Capabilities are ‘first-order’ and are likely to result in 
improved performance, when organizations demonstrate the ability to deploy those 
resources in the attainment of a desired goal.  Core, or distinct, capabilities are ‘second-
order’ and are the result of a bundle of an organization’s resources and capabilities that 
are strategically important to maintaining its competitive advantage at a specific point in 
time.  This leads to the ‘third-order’ dynamic capabilities.  These capabilities emphasize 
an organization’s constant pursuit of the renewal, reconfiguration and re-creation of 
resources, capabilities and core capabilities addressing a changing environment.   
Danneels (2002; 2008) take a slightly different view from Wang et al. (2007) and 
refer to the capacity of an organization to create new resources and competencies as its 
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‘second order competences’.  These second order competencies, are similar to first order 
(Danneels, 2002) or ‘ordinary’ (Winter, 2003) competences in that they are 
heterogeneously distributed among organizations and thus may serve as the basis of 
superior performance.  In a dynamic world, only organizations that continually build new 
strategic assets faster and less expensively than their competition will earn superior rents 
(Danneels, 2012).  Danneels (2012) further posits that organizations achieving these 
second order competencies are able to create new resources such that it allows them to 
imitate and substitute resources of competing organizations.  In effect, achieving what 
Schumpeter identified as creative destruction.  This Schumpeterian competition provides 
for competing organizations to continually maneuver to outdo and undermine each other 
(D’Aveni, 1994; Schumpeter, 1942). 
Dynamic Capabilities 
The most basic and enduring question in the field of strategic management is how 
do organizations achieve and sustain the often elusive competitive advantage.  Dynamic 
capability is the evolutionary extension of the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm 
(Barney 1986b; 1991; 1994; Wernerfelt, 1984).   Dynamic capabilities research attempts 
to analyze the sources of wealth creation by organizations.  The concept seeks to explain 
success and failure at the organizational level.  The publication of Teece et al.’s (1997) 
article “Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management” foreshadowed a growing flow 
of research into the concept of dynamic capabilities.  An extensive review of the 
literature by Barreto (2010) found in excess of 1,500 articles referencing dynamic 
capabilities in the period from 1997 to 2007.  He further found that the number of articles 
considering dynamic capabilities as a key element of the focal study has been growing.  
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From the period 1997 to 2007, Barreto found 40 articles published in leading 
management journals, including the Academy of Management Journal, Academy of 
Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Management, Journal 
of Management Studies, Management Science, Organizational Science, and Strategic 
Management Journal. 
The extant research provides a wide assortment of distinct conceptualizations of 
dynamic capabilities.  Table 3 lists some of the more popular definitions of dynamic 
capabilities. 
Table 3:  Dynamic Capability Definitions 
Scholars Working definition 
Teece & Pisano (1994) The collection of capabilities and 
competencies allowing the organization to 
create new products and processes thus 
responding to changing market 
circumstances. 
Teece, Pisano & Shuen (1997) The organizations ability to combine, build 
and reconfigure internal and external 
competencies in response to changing 
environments. 
Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) The organizations processes to integrate, 
reconfigure, gain and release resources to 
match and or create market change.  The 
organizational and strategic routines 
utilized to achieve new resource 
configurations in response to markets 
emerging, colliding, splitting, evolving and 
dying.  
Teece (2000) The ability to quickly sense and seize 
opportunities. 
Zollo & Winter (2002) A learned and stable pattern of collective 
activities by which the organization 
generates and alters its operating routines to 
improve effectiveness. 
Winter (2003) Capabilities that extend, modify or create 
ordinary capabilities. 
Zahra, Sapienza & Davidsson (2006) The ability to reconfigure resources and 
routines in keeping with the vision and 
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appropriateness of the principle decision 
maker. 
Helfat et al. (2007) The capability of an organization to 
purposefully create, extend, or modify its 
resource base. 
Teece (2007) The capacity to: (a) sense and shape 
opportunities and threats, (b) to seize 
opportunities, and (c) maintain 
competitiveness by enhancing, combining, 
protecting and reconfiguring the 
organizations assets, both tangible and 
intangible. 
Wang and Ahmed (2007) Define dynamic capabilities as a firm’s 
behavioral orientation to constantly 
integrate, reconfigure, renew and recreate 
its resources and capabilities.  They posit 
that upgrading and reconstructing the 
organization’s core capabilities in response 
to the changing environment is primary to 
attaining and sustaining a competitive 
advantage.   
Source: Barreto (2010) 
As previously discussed, the RBV recommends that the organization deploy its 
resources and capabilities strategically, allowing them to exploit their distinctive 
competencies in a manner that best creates a sustainable competitive advantage.  RBV’s 
central tenet positions superior performance as a result of the utilization the 
organization’s resources (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).  Danneels (2012) suggests that 
rents accruing from a particular resource pool are transitory, and as a result, organizations 
need to excel at continuously creating new resources and configuring them into 
competencies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).   
Dynamic capabilities are the antecedent organizational and strategic routines 
around which organizations reconfigure their resource base; acquire and shed resources, 
integrate them together, and recombine them to generate potential new value creating 
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strategies (Grant, 1996b; Pisano, 1994).  They become the drivers in the creation, 
evolution, and recombination of other resources towards the creation of competitive 
advantage (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994; Teece et al., 1997).  Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) go on to define dynamic capabilities as:  
“The firm’s processes that use resources – specifically the processes to 
integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources – to match and even 
create market change.  Dynamic capabilities thus are the organizational 
and strategic routines by which firms achieve new resource configurations 
as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die” (p. 1107).   
 
Wang and Ahmed (2007) posit that dynamic capabilities are not merely processes, but are 
embedded in processes; processes that are often explicit or codifiable structuring and 
combinations of resources, and as such, can easily be transferred within and across the 
organization.   
A sustainable competitive advantage does not evolve from a static stock of 
competencies, rather such an advantage is the result of the continuous accumulation of 
competencies (Reed & DeFillippi, 1990).  Organizations that best develop and manage 
their respective resources and capabilities over time will outperform their competition 
(Hitt & Ireland, 1985).  These organizational specific capabilities are deeply rooted in the 
routines and practices of the organization and as a result are usually difficult for 
competitors to imitate and therefor serve as a main source of long term competitive 
advantage (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).  Ultimately, it is up to management to exploit these 
capabilities to the organization’s greatest advantage.   As emphasized by Collins (1994), 
dynamic capabilities govern the rate of change of capabilities.   
When the competitive environment is shifting, the dynamic capabilities by which 
organizations’ integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to 
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address rapidly changing environments (Teece et al., 1997) becomes the source of the 
organization’s sustained competitive advantage.  In contrast to Teece et al. (1997), 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) assert that the functionalities associated with dynamic 
capabilities are not idiomatic. Organizations can, and often do, end up with capabilities 
similar in their attributes.  There are multiple paths towards achieving the same end 
capabilities (i.e., the principle of equifinality).  “Dynamic capabilities are necessary, but 
not sufficient conditions for sustaining a competitive advantage” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000 p. 1106).  They posit that dynamic capabilities can be used to enhance existing 
resource configurations in the pursuit of a long term competitive advantage.  However, 
they are frequently utilized to establish new resource configurations in the pursuit of a 
temporary advantage.  To this end, dynamic capabilities facilitates the strategic challenge 
of maintaining a competitive advantage when the duration of that advantage is 
unpredictable, where time is an essential aspect, and the dynamic capabilities that drive 
the competitive advantage are unstable processes that are, unto themselves, difficult to 
sustain (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).   
The dynamic capabilities approach stresses that competitive advantage requires an 
organization to simultaneously exploit and explore their organizational specific 
competencies and capabilities to address changing environments.  This is of particular 
relevance in a Schumpeterian environment of innovation-based competition, 
price/performance rivalry, increasing returns, and the ‘creative destruction’ of existing 
competencies (Teece et al., 1997).  Elements of the approach are, in fact, found in 
Schumpeter (1942), Penrose (1959), Prahalad and Hamel (1990), and Teece (1986a; 
1986b; 1987; 1997).  Additionally, Grant (1996a); Pisano (1994); Teece et al. (1997); 
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Henderson and Cockburn (1994); Eisenhardt and Martin (2000); Wang and Ahmed 
(2007); Amit and Schoemaker (1993); Winter (2003) and Danneels (2002; 2008; 2012) 
also identify, to varying degrees, three main component factors of dynamic capabilities, 
specifically; adaptive capability, absorptive capability and innovative capability. 
Adaptive Capability.  Adaptive capability is defined as an organization’s ability to 
identify and capitalize on emerging market opportunities (Chakravarthy, 1982; Miles & 
Snow, 1978).  Chakravarthy (1982) distinguishes adaptive capability from adaptation.  
The latter [adaptation] describes an optimal end state of survival for an organization, 
while adaptive capability focuses more on the effective search and balancing of 
explorative and exploitive strategies (Staber & Sydow, 2002).  This balancing act 
between exploration and exploitation is brought to a strategic level and is linked to the 
resource based perspective.  An organization’s adaptive capability is manifested as a 
strategic flexibility; the inherent flexibility of the organizational resources and its 
flexibility in applying them (Sanchez, 1995).  The development of adaptive capability is 
often accompanied by the evolution of organizational forms (Wang & Ahmed, 2007).  
Firms that have high levels of adaptive capability exhibit dynamic capabilities (Teece et 
al., 1997). 
Absorptive Capability.  Absorptive capability is referred to by Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) as the ability of the organization to recognize the value of new, external 
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends.  This ability to evaluate and 
utilize knowledge, both inside and outside of the organization, is principally a function of 
the level of prior knowledge.  Organizations with a higher absorptive capability usually 
demonstrate a stronger ability for learning from partners, integrating external information 
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and ultimately transforming it into organizationally-embedded knowledge.  Empirical 
studies (George, 2005; Salvato, 2003; Verona & Ravasi, 2003) reveal that an 
organization’s ability to acquire external, new knowledge, assimilate it with existing, 
internal knowledge and create new knowledge is an important facet of dynamic 
capabilities.   The more an organization demonstrates its absorptive capability, the more 
it exhibits dynamic capabilities.  For example, George (2005) examined the effects of 
experiential learning of the cost of capability development by examining data on 
patenting and licensing activities at the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation.  This 
study provided evidence of a curvilinear relationship between experiential learning within 
a capability and the costs of developing the same capability.  The work of Salvato (2003) 
develops the concept of a core micro-strategy, defined as an established system of 
interconnected routines, micro-activities and resources that can be identified throughout 
most of an organization’s strategic initiatives.  Verona and Ravasi (2003) examined the 
impressive capability of Oticon A/S, a leading company in the hearing-aid industry, to 
develop new products.  Their finding showed linkages between knowledge based 
processes and a coherent mix of organizational resources.     
Innovative Capability.  Innovation capability is defined by Crossan and Apaydin 
(2010) as:  
“production or adoption, assimilation and exploitation of a value-added 
novelty in economic and social spheres; renewal and enlargement of 
products, services, and markets; development of new methods of 
production; and establishment of new management systems.  It is both a 
process and an outcome” (p. 1155).   
 
Schumpeter (1934) viewed innovation as being reflected in novel outputs; a new good or 
a new quality of a good; a new method of production; a new market; a new source of 
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supply; or a new organizational structure.  Innovation can be summarized as doing things 
differently. 
The Crossan and Apaydin (2010) definition captures the more salient aspects of 
innovation.  It includes internally conceived, as well as externally adopted innovation, 
e.g., production or adoption and it recognizes innovation as a creative process by 
including application in the form of exploitation.  Further, this definition acknowledges 
innovation’s intended benefits, e.g., value-added, at many levels of analysis.  Ultimately, 
the definition allows for the possibility that innovation may be relative as opposed to an 
absolute novelty.  Finally, it draws attention to the two roles of innovation, a process and 
an outcome. 
Wang and Ahmed (2007) posit that adaptive capability, absorptive capability and 
innovative capability are the most important component factors of dynamic capabilities.  
They suggest that these three components are integral to an organization’s ability to 
integrate, reconfigure, renew and recreate its resources and capabilities in keeping with 
external environmental changes.  They further suggest that the focus of an organization’s 
adaptive capability is to align its internal organizational factors with external 
environmental factors.  Absorptive capability emphasizes the importance of taking 
external knowledge and combining it with internal organizational knowledge and 
ultimately absorbing it for internal use.  Innovative capability exhibits the linkage 
between an organization’s inherent ability to respond to the dynamics of their market by 
innovating new products or services in response to changes in the market.  Innovative 
capabilities tacitly explain and demonstrate the connections between the organization’s 
capabilities and resources with its product market. 
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The ability of an organization to accomplish and integrate these three capabilities, 
adaptive, absorptive and innovativeness gets to the heart of the question; how do 
organizations survive in the face of increasingly rapid change?  This fundamental 
question has been the subject of examination in a wide spectrum of disciplines, including; 
management, marketing, history, organizational sociology, psychology and economics.  
Underlying this area of research is the question: Can organizations adapt and change, and 
if so, how does this occur?  The extant research presents two major schools of thought:  
those that argue for adaptation, e.g., punctuated equilibrium, dynamic capabilities; and 
those that argue that organizations are inert and change occurs through a more 
evolutionary like process of variation, selection, and retention.   
Ambidexterity 
Dynamic capabilities, and their role in providing organizations with a long term 
competitive advantage, offer a way to explain organizational adaptation.  Increases in 
competitive rivalry and more rapid and unpredictable shifts in environmental conditions 
suggest that organizations need to simultaneously explore and exploit (March, 1991; 
Sutton, 2002) as well as operate both flexibly and efficiently (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Tushman & O’Reilly, 1997; Volberda, 1996) 
Central to the notion of an organization’s ability to adapt is how the organization 
exploits existing assets and market positions to produce profits, while simultaneously 
exploring new technologies and markets.  Duncan (1976) and Tushman and O’Reilly 
(2008; 1997) identify ambidexterity as exemplifying the degree to which the organization 
configures and reconfigures its resources and capabilities allowing for the capture of both 
existing and new opportunities.  
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Ambidexterity is about engaging in both exploitation and exploration.  
Exploitation, at one end of the continuum, is about efficiencies; refining existing 
knowledge, increasing productivity, control, certainty, and variance reduction.  
Exploration, at the other end of the continuum, is about search; discovery, autonomy, 
new knowledge recreation, innovation and variance acceptance (O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2008; Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009) 
As expressed by March (1991), these two ends of the continuum provide a 
fundamental tension confronting an organization’s long term survival.  “The basic 
problem confronting an organization is to engage in sufficient exploitation to ensure its 
current viability and, at the same time, devote enough energy to exploration to ensure its 
future viability” (p. 105).  The end objective is in configuring and reconfiguring 
organizational resources to capture existing as well as new rent producing opportunities 
(Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000; Holmqvist, 2004; March, 1991; Teece, 2007).  In essence, 
these paradoxical capabilities serve as the basis of ambidexterity (Duncan, 1976; 
Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996).    
Danneels (2002) contends that successful organizations need not only have the 
capability to generate new knowledge aimed at creating new products and services for 
emerging markets, but also need the ability to leverage current and existing competencies 
in the exploitation of existing products and services in current markets.  Jansen, 
Tempelaar, van den Bosch & Volberda (2009) support the view that the processes and 
routines required for an organization to be ambidextrous are a dynamic capability.  That 
ambidextrous organizations are more facile at mobilizing, coordinating, and integrating 
what are often contradictory efforts, and allocating, reallocating, combining and 
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recombining organizational resources and assets across exploratory and exploitive 
activities (Teece, 2007; Tushman & O’Reilly, 2007).   
In some of the research, ambidexterity appears as a bi-polar condition.  In this 
view, ambidexterity is manifested by a sequential pattern of relatively long periods of 
exploitation interspersed with short bursts of exploration, what Burgelman (2002), 
Duncan (1976) and Gupta, et al. (2006) identify as punctuated equilibrium.  This 
approach creates a paradoxical situation because the short term efficiencies and control 
focus associated with exploitative activities is often at odds with the longer term 
experimental focus and decentralization associated with exploratory activities (Floyd & 
Lane, 2000). 
Abernathy (1978) highlights the inconsistencies between exploitative activities 
focused on productivity improvements and cost reductions, and those explorative 
activities focused on innovation and flexibility.  Although both orientations are important 
for organizational survival, exploration and exploitation are contradictory organizational 
processes (Adler et al. 1999; Benner & Tushman, 2003; March, 1991; Teece et al. 1997).  
Hedberg, Bystrom and Starbuck (1976) suggest that organizations engage in multiple 
forms of learning (exploration and exploitation) by alternating between different 
organizational designs and by being both consistent and inconsistent in their actions 
(Benner & Tushman, 2003).  In Duncan’s view, ambidexterity occurs sequentially as 
organizations switch structures to accommodate evolving innovation. 
The works of Eisenhardt and Brown (1998), Lovas and Ghoshal (1998), and 
Venkatraman et al. (2007) support a temporal sequencing view of organizational 
adaptation.  In their longitudinal study of software firms, Venkatraman et al. (2007) 
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found that sequential ambidexterity was the main effect impacting sales growth providing 
support for ambidexterity as a dynamic.   
The tension between exploitation and exploration results in competition for scarce 
organizational resources and attention.  Thus, sustaining an optimal mix between the two 
is challenging, and often results in tradeoffs (Simsek, Heavey, Veiga, & Souder, 2009).  
Levinthal and March (1993) suggest that by combining exploration with exploitation, 
organizations can overcome the structural inertia resulting from an excessive focus on 
exploitation, while simultaneously refraining from an overabundance of exploration 
without gaining benefits. 
Tushman and O’Reilly (2008; 1997) posited an alternative view by arguing that 
given the complexity and pace of change faced by many organizations and the time 
needed to develop new products and services, ambidexterity may require that exploitation 
and exploration be pursued simultaneously.  They further suggested that separate 
subunits, business models, along with distinct alignments were required for each 
capability.  The result of a series of detailed case studies of fifteen business units, 
comprising thirty-six episodes of innovation, O’Reilly and Tushman (2004) determined 
that organizations that pursued ambidexterity utilizing independent units were more 
successful.  Their study supports the notion that ambidextrous organizational design 
facilitates simultaneous exploration and exploitation. 
March (1991) clearly is supportive of a multidimensional approach, with an 
emphasis on the necessity for pursuing both exploitative and explorative types of 
activities.  He does argue that there is always tension between exploitation and 
exploration whenever an organization must decide on how to allocate resources.  The 
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tension between exploitation and exploration is difficult and is most often biased toward 
exploitation.  March (1991) further posits that an over emphasis and focus on exploitation 
to the exclusion of exploration sets the condition for a competency, or success trap, which 
in turn often leads to organizational inertia and ultimately obsolescence.  March endorses 
the necessary duality of pursuing both approaches as an attempt to achieve an optimal 
mix (Simsek et al., 2009).  This tendency results as a manifestation of the positive 
feedback the organization receives from its existing customers and the resulting profits 
from those customers (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Gupta et al., 2006).  March (2003 p. 
14) argues that because of this short term orientation “established organizations will 
always specialize in exploitation, in becoming more efficient in using what they already 
know.  Such organizations will become dominant in the short run, but will gradually 
become obsolescent and fail.”  
In contrast, too much emphasis and focus on exploration, to the detriment of 
exploitation, often leads to a different failure trap, one in which the organization receives 
insufficient return for its acquired knowledge.  March (1991 p. 71) expressed this as 
organizations that engage excessively in exploration “exhibit too many underdeveloped 
new ideas and too little distinctive competencies.” As such, returns associated with 
exploration are more uncertain, more distant in time, and often even a threat to existing 
organizational units.  These organizations are often less facile at exploration and face 
greater exposure to technological and market changes (Siggelkow, 2001).   
In this conceptualization of ambidexterity, not only are separate structural 
subunits for exploitation and exploration often needed, but different competencies, 
systems, incentives, process and cultures, each internally aligned, may also be needed 
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(O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008).  Exploitative subunits focus on efficiency while 
exploratory subunits focus on experimentation and improvisation.  Tushman et al. (2003) 
argue that ambidextrous organizations do not switch between exploration and 
exploitation, rather they do both simultaneously.  That such organizations, also do not 
rely upon spinout, internal venture groups, or venture capital to generate new or 
innovative options, rather they develop such options internally.  
An ambidextrous organization is one that is capable of both balancing and 
exploiting existing competencies while simultaneously exploring new opportunities.  A 
core tenet of ambidexterity is an organization’s ability to manage the contradictions and 
multiple tensions associated with dealing with today and tomorrow, efficiency and 
effectiveness, alignment and adaptation, and optimization and innovation (Venkatraman 
et al., 2007).  Some of the more recent research has begun to examine exploration and 
exploitation as independent orientations, orthogonal to each other, such that an 
organization can opt to engage in high levels of both orientations at the same time (Gupta 
et al., 2006).  In this view, ambidexterity is the capacity of an organization to pursue high 
levels of exploration and exploitation concurrently as purported by Beckman (2006), 
Jansen et al. (2006), Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006) and Lubatkin et al. (2006), and 
managing trade-offs to find the most appropriate balance between the two.  
“Ambidextrous organizations simultaneously operate in multiple time frames as they 
exploit and explore at the same time” (Tushman et al., 2003 p. 10).  Jansen (2009) further 
suggests that an organization’s ability to concurrently pursue these dynamic capabilities 
is the most effective means for achieving organizational ambidexterity. 
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Cao et al. (2009) expand and reconfigure the organizational ambidexterity 
concept by unpacking the previous views into two dimensions.  They designated them as 
the balanced dimension of ambidexterity and the combined dimension of ambidexterity.  
The balanced dimension reflects an organization’s orientation to maintain a close relative 
balance between exploratory and exploitive activities, while the combined dimension 
examines the combined magnitude of the two activities.  They reason that the dimensions 
are conceptually distinct and rely on different causal mechanisms effecting organizational 
performance.  By explicitly distinguishing between these dimensions of ambidexterity, 
Cao et al. (2009) provide a greater degree of precision to the conceptualization and 
operationalization of the construct.  They posit that whereas the balanced dimension 
reduces damaging effects of over engagement in exploitation to the detriment of 
exploration and vice versa, the combined dimension enhances organizational 
performance through the generation of a greater pool of complementary resources that 
may be leveraged across both orientations (Tushman, 1997).  
The position can be taken that the conceptualization of organizational 
ambidexterity is itself ambidextrous.  On one hand, it is argued that exploration and 
exploitation are bi-polar in their implementation, what Duncan (1976) and later 
Burgelman (2002) refer to as punctuated equilibrium.  On the other hand is the position 
postulated by Tushman et al. (2003), and further supported by Guptal et al. (2006), 
Venkatraman (2007) and Cao et al. (2009) that exploration and exploitation can, and do, 
exist simultaneously at high (or low) levels within an organization.   
Boumgarden et al. (2012) attempts to span the gulf between the punctuated 
equilibrium position presented by Duncan (1976) and Burgelman (2002) and the view 
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that exploration and exploitation can exist simultaneously as posited by Tushman et al.  
(2003), Gupta et al. (2006), Venkatraman (2007) and Cao et al. (2009), with an 
alternative proposition that they refer to as “organizational vacillation” (p. 588).  In 
Boumgarden et al’s. (2012) discussion, organizational vacillation is when an organization 
temporally and sequentially alternates its structure and resulting focus between high 
levels of exploration and exploitation.  Organizational vacillation entails the organization 
modulating between an orientation focused exploration and an orientation focused on 
exploitation. 
The difference between Boumgarden et al’s. (2012) conceptualization of 
organizational vacillation and Burgelman’s (2002) position on punctuated equilibrium 
may well lie in the means of transition between the explorative and exploitative 
orientations.  The punctuated equilibrium view has the transition between the two 
orientations as discrete and static in nature, while organizational oscillation views the 
transition as being dynamic and fluid.  In the organizational vacillation view, the 
positioning on either exploration or exploitation is temporal, and that as the organization 
expands and diminishes its energies in one direction it gathers and expands momentum in 
the other (Boumgarden et al., 2012).  This research recognizes the coexistence or 
orthogonal operationalization of ambidexterity while accepting the dynamic transitions 
between the axes presented in organizational vacillation.   
Organizational change is most often driven by innovation as “all adaption, 
whether evolutionary or revolutionary requires innovation” (Gupta, Tesluk, & Taylor, 
2007 pg. 885).  Long term performance requires an organization has the ability to evolve 
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and adapt through innovation, while simultaneously continuing to perform in the near 
term (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Smith & Tushman, 2005; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996).   
Organizational Structure 
Strategically, achieving long term viability requires an organization excel not only 
in the operational competencies to compete in their existing markets, but also have the 
ability to recombine and reconfigure their assets and organizational structure to adapt to 
emerging markets and technologies.  Duncan (1976), building on the work of Burns and 
Stalker (1961) and Thompson (1967), first used the term “organizational ambidexterity” 
and argued that in order to be successful in the long term, organizations needed to 
consider a dual structure.   
Organizations accomplish their various operations via organizational structures 
defining the distribution of power, resources and responsibilities across the myriad of 
functions and units comprising the organization.  Alternative structures facilitate 
exploration and exploitation.  Exploration entails problem solving and new knowledge 
acquisition approaches in manners that make routine information processing and 
centralized decision making inefficient.  Exploitation, in contrast, is based more on 
incremental improvements in processes and products.  It is often better accomplished 
through more traditional and formal organizational routines (Lavie et al., 2010).  In 
addition to the tensions associated with allocating resources to support either exploration 
or exploitation, this duality also entails conflicting organizational routines that offset each 
other (Lavie et al., 2009). 
Tushman et al. (2003) define an ambidextrous organization as a business unit(s) 
with a high degree of structural differentiation, relatively low levels of structural 
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integration, and a high level of senior team integration.  In essence, the design provides 
for contradictory architectures reflecting the contrasting requirements of exploration and 
exploitation.  Extending the discussion regarding organizational formation, the 
incremental approach provides that organizations are not subject to inertial focus and can 
therefor evolve through paced, continuous, incremental change (Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1997).  The punctuated equilibrium school argues that organizational evolution occurs 
through periods of incremental change punctuated by discontinuous change or upheaval 
(Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). 
  Tushman et al. (2003) posit that in organizations emphasizing an ambidextrous 
design, where differentiated units both explore and exploit, such a design may facilitate 
building dynamic capabilities through both incremental and proactive punctuated change.  
It may well be that such ambidextrous structures create an environment supporting both 
multiple selection and change modes.  As such, exploitation is supported by an 
environment of incremental, continuous change tied to a specific organizational 
trajectory.  Exploration, in contrast, is an extension of an organizational learning mode 
based upon experiences from which the senior team engages in strategic bets on the 
organizations future (Tushman et al., 2003). 
Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) divide the concept of organizational ambidexterity 
into two separate, but related, constructs.  The first and more standardly recognized is 
structural ambidexterity whereby the organization creates separate structures for different 
types of activities.  The argument for this approach is that because the activities 
associated with exploration and exploitation are so different they cannot effectively 
coexist.  However, the weakness in this approach is that separation can also result in 
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isolation.  As a result, new ideas can be overlooked or left unaccepted because of the 
apparent lack of linkage back to the core business. 
Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) address this phenomenon in the development and 
exploration with the second construct - contextual ambidexterity.  At the individual level, 
contextual ambidexterity allows the individual employee, during the course of their day-
to-day work, to opt between alignment-orientated and adaptation-orientated activities.  
When operationalized at the organizational level, contextual ambidexterity becomes the 
collective orientation of the organization’s employees toward the simultaneous pursuit of 
alignment and adaptability.  This view is in keeping with the Brown and Eisenhardt 
(1997) view of continuous change. 
A significant amount of the extant literature on ambidexterity focuses on the 
structural separation between alignment and adaptability orientated activities.  
Birkinshaw and Gibson posit (2004 p. 55) “Contextual ambidexterity isn’t an alternative 
to structural ambidexterity but rather a complement”.  They argue that structural 
separation is a means for providing new initiatives the space and resources they may need 
to establish traction.  To this end, structural separation should be temporary and that 
contextual ambidexterity can enhance both the initial separation and later reintegration 
processes within the organization. 
Lavie et al. (2010) support the argument that contextual ambidexterity addresses 
the tension between exploration and exploitation by suggesting that these activities can be 
maintained simultaneously.  Organizational separation provides for spatial buffering thus 
allowing exploration and exploitation to occur simultaneously but within separate and 
distinct organizational units.  Domain separation differs from organizational separation in 
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that it allows for simultaneous exploration and exploitation within the same unit but with 
exploration in one domain and exploitation in another. 
Temporal separation suggests that exploration and exploitation coexist in the 
same organization but at different times.  This is more in keeping with the punctuated 
equilibrium view expressed by Romanelli and Tushman (1994).  Organizations switch 
between exploration and exploitation depending upon a variety of organizational and 
environmental factors and needs. 
Innovation 
Conflict and paradox abound in most organizations, Thompson (1967 p. 150) 
suggests that “the paradox of administration [involves] the dual searches for certainty and 
flexibility”.  Firms are under constant pressure to address these dualities of being big and 
small, efficient and effective, to operate in multiple time frames, and to be Prospectors 
and Defenders (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Miles & Snow, 1978).  It may be argued that 
sustained organizational performance is a function of organizing for both short term and 
long term innovation.  The degree of change [innovation] within an organization can be 
incremental or radical.  Innovation that slightly impacts an organization or market is 
deemed as incremental, while radical innovation is “major in scope and breadth, 
involving strategic innovations or creation of new products, services or markets” 
(Koberg, Detienne, & Heppard, 2003 p. 24).   
He and Wong (2004) expound upon innovation by distinguishing between 
technological innovation and organizational innovation.  They present organizational 
innovation as involving changes to organizational structures and administrative 
processes.  Technological innovation entails commercializing technological knowledge 
43 
 
 
into new products or processes.  While technological innovation was the primary focus of 
He and Wong’s (2004) study, an outcome of their findings was to garner support for 
pursuing an ambidextrous organizational design.  They found that managing the tension 
between exploration and exploitation was best accomplished on a continuous basis.  
Their findings are in keeping with synthesizing capabilities in the adaption of an 
ambidextrous design as posited by Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) and what Brown and 
Eisenhardt (1997) present as a semi-structure design allowing an organization to compete 
on the “edge of chaos”. 
Taylor and Greve (2006) espouse the concept of variance into the dialogue.  They 
argue that any new product that is an incremental extension of an existing product should 
result in a positive financial return, what they identify as a high mean performance, but it 
should not provide for any inordinate profit or loss.  On the other hand, products that 
represent a dramatic departure from past or extant products provide for a potential 
extreme in profits and losses, what they refer to as high variance in performance, but will 
most likely have a lower expected mean due to their higher probability of failure (Taylor 
& Greve, 2006).  March (1991) referred to this phenomenon of organizational exploration 
as introducing experiments of uncertain value into the organization’s activities versus 
exploitation which maintains and reaffirms the organization’s current activities. 
Smith and Tushman (2005) reaffirm March’s (1991) assertion that innovation at 
the expense of existing products and services results in suboptimal outcomes due to the 
organization’s failure to capture benefits associated with historical efficiencies.  These 
existing products and services generate the slack resources, knowledge and process 
routines that facilitate the launch of new products and services.  Similarly, Leonard-
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Barton (1992) and Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) suggest that innovation generates new 
knowledge, along with access to new markets and customer awareness, leading to 
enhancing existing products and services. 
Tushman and Smith (2002) define innovation streams as the portfolio of products 
simultaneously managed by an organization or strategic business unit.  These products 
are defined in terms relative to the technology and markets of the organization’s existing 
products (Abernathy & Clark, 1985).  Innovation within the organization can be 
incremental (Christensen, 1997; Dosi, 1982), architectural in nature (Henderson & Clark 
(1990), or discontinuous Gatignon et al. (2002).  Additionally, Abernathy and Clark 
(1985) suggest innovation can encompass existing customers or new customers in 
defined markets, or as emerging markets (Christensen, 1997).  Smith and Tushman 
(2005) conclude that an organization’s innovation stream is comprised of continuing 
incremental innovation in the organization’s extant products or services, along with at 
least one nonincremental innovation. 
Much of the extant research on “innovation” is primarily linked to the research 
and development (R&D) activities associated with the creation of new products 
(Armbruster, Bikfalvi, Kinkel, & Lay, 2008).  The Schumpeterian (1934) definition of 
innovation extends beyond the single focus of technical or product innovation.  
Schumpeter delineates between five distinct types of innovation:  new products, new 
production methods, new markets, new sources of supply, and new forms of organization.  
Other scholars (e.g., Anderson & King, 1993; Damanpour & Evan, 1984; Totterdell, 
Leach, Birdi, Clegg, & Wall, 2002) consider innovation as a complex phenomenon with a 
technical element, e.g., new products or production methods, and a non-technical 
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element, e.g., new markets and new forms of organization.  Additionally, innovation 
comprises product innovations, e.g., new products or services, and process innovation, 
e.g., new production methods or forms of organization.  Armbruster et al. (2008 p. 644) 
separate innovation into four distinct types: “(1) technical product innovation, (2) non-
technical service innovation, (3) technical process innovation, and (4) non-technical 
process innovation, understood to be organizational innovations”. 
Benner and Tushman (2003) classify innovation into two dimensions: (1) 
proximity to the organizations current technological trajectory and (2) its proximity to the 
organization’s existing customer and market segment.  Various innovation types on the 
technological dimension present contrasting determinants and organizational effects 
(Morone, 1993; Tushman & Smith, 2002).  At one end is incremental innovation, 
characterized by small changes, building upon the organization’s extant technological 
capabilities.  Radical innovation, as posited by Dosi (1982) and Green et al. (1995) 
presents fundamental changes to the organization’s technological trajectory and by 
extension its organizational competencies.  Christensen and Bower (1996) suggest 
classifying innovation by whether it addresses the needs of existing customers and 
markets or is targeted towards new or emergent customers and markets. Innovations 
falling into this category are usually disruptive to existing organizational structures and 
require significant departures from the organization’s existing activities.   
Ambidextrous organizational forms are built upon internally inconsistent 
architectures so that the organization can both explore and exploit (Adler et al., 1999)  
Achievement of this form involves highly differentiated units as well as management 
integration within the organization (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2002; He & Wong, 2004; 
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Tushman & O’Reilly, 1997).  Top management serves as the focal point for the 
contrasting agendas of exploration and exploitation.  The top management team needs to 
develop techniques allowing them to consistently be inconsistent, thus negotiating a 
balance between the need to be small and large, centralized and decentralized, and 
focused on both the short term and long term simultaneously (Benner & Tushman, 2003; 
Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Hedberg et al., 1976). 
Innovation streams within the boundaries of the ambidextrous organization 
reconcile the paradoxical demands of exploration and exploitation.  They accomplish this 
by establishing internally inconsistent architectures within a single organization.  These 
contrasting architectures provide the benefits of experimentation and variability while 
simultaneously providing for exploitation and process control.  In order to drive streams 
of innovation, these apparently inconsistent units must be strategically integrated (Benner 
& Tushman, 2003). 
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CHAPTER 3:  HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The Miles and Snow (1978) typology has served as one of the fundamental 
building blocks in the study of what has evolved into the domain of strategic 
management.  Prior to their work, there were two competing views dominating the field 
of business level strategy.  On one side were the pundits who proposed the design and 
implementation of a business level strategy as being situational, that strategy was a 
reactionary response to external variables and to a large degree, inconsistent and non-
generalizable.  On the other side were those who posited a “universal” view of strategy, 
where market share, superior product quality, and the like, was always a good thing 
(Hambrick, 2003).   
Another, albeit unintended, outcome of the Miles and Snow typology is its 
multilevel view of the organization.  Much of the literature on organizational strategy 
focuses on either a macro (the linkages between the organization and the environment) or 
a micro (the behavioral dynamics of the implementation process) view of the 
organization.  The Miles and Snow typology spans the two foci by examining facets of 
both in a more holistic manner, in essence providing cross-level position.  This seminal 
work stimulated an entire stream of research examining the underlying orientations 
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organizations assume in their strategic formulation and implementation.  As detailed 
earlier, Miles and Snow (1978) identify three, interlinked decision domains that define an 
organization’s strategic orientation and focus.  The entrepreneurial domain, with its 
focus on product-market selection falls within the macro view.  The administrative 
domain, with its focus on the structures and relationships within the organization lands in 
the confines of the micro view.  Finally, the engineering domain, focusing on the 
processes required to address the entrepreneurial domain problem, straddle the space 
between the macro and micro views.   
An examination of the Miles and Snow (1978) typology utilizing the broad basis 
of the RBV and dynamic capabilities with a specific focus on ambidexterity leads to the 
development of a number of testable hypotheses.  The three domains identified in the 
typology present a variety of organizational capabilities, that depending upon how an 
organization deploys them; meet the RBV requirements for being valuable, rare, 
inimitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991).  
 The dynamic capabilities view emphasizes the need for an organization to 
continually realign and reconfigure its resources to maintain a competitive advantage in a 
mutable environment.  Ambidexterity provides for organizational designs supporting the 
exploration of available ideas for the generation of major innovations, while 
simultaneously refining existing products and processes.  Consistent with prior research 
(Benner & Tushman, 2002; March, 1991; Taylor & Greve, 2006), this process tends to 
facilitate the increase in mean performance as opposed to dispersion of performance.    
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Entrepreneurial Problem    
Within the Miles and Snow typology, the entrepreneurial problem focuses on the 
extent the organization exploits existing products or markets and explores new 
opportunities for products or markets.  The problem manifests itself as an attempt by 
management to isolate a portion of the total market in order to create a stable product or 
service offering that is clearly directed at a specific market segment (Miles & Snow, 
1978).  This need to balance exploration and exploitation is central to Tushman and 
O’Reilly’s (1996) conceptualization of an ambidextrous organization.  The basis of the 
ambidextrous posture is that organizations capable of operating simultaneously to explore 
and exploit are more likely to achieve superior performance over organizations 
emphasizing one of the orientations at the expense of the other.  Exploitation of existing 
capabilities is often needed to explore new capabilities, and exploration of new 
capabilities enhances an organization’s existing knowledge base.  Organizations 
differentiate themselves not only to the degree they explore new things, but also to the 
degree they master old or existing capabilities (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). 
The dynamic capabilities paradigm posits that in order for an organization to 
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage it must develop new capabilities (explore) 
and perfect existing capabilities (exploit).  It is possible for an organization to achieve a 
potentially less sustainable advantage by focusing closer to one dimension or the other.  
The ambidextrous organization strives for a higher level of balance between the 
exploratory and exploitive dimensions, or a closer match in the relative magnitude of 
exploratory and exploitive activities resulting in a more structured control of performance 
risk (Cao et al., 2009).  Conversely, an imbalance between the two dimensions poses 
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threats through an increase in performance risks (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 
1991).  Specifically, when an organization’s magnitude of exploitation well exceeds its 
exploration, the organization is likely to be subject to the risk of obsolescence.  These 
organizations may enjoy short term success from exploiting existing products or markets, 
but may be unsustainable in the face of significant market or technological change 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986).  In this regard, existing competencies can quickly become 
outdated and by extension lead to powerful path dependencies (Christensen & Overdorf, 
2000) or core rigidities (Leonard‐Barton, 1992).   
Utilizing these lenses, the Defender archetype has a narrow and focused 
concentration on the exploitation dimension.  Defenders are most likely to direct their 
products or services specifically to a limited segment of the potential market.  The 
specified market is often one perceived as the healthiest and most viable.  The Defender 
looks to continue to serve satisfied customers and thus stabilize relations within the 
market segment such as to maintain a continuous flow and acceptance of their products 
and services (Miles & Snow, 1978). 
Defenders often stake the organization’s success on their ability to aggressively 
maintain their market position within their chosen market segment.  Defender 
organizations tend to ignore product or service developments outside their selected 
domain.  Attention is focused on the continuous and intensive efforts to remain the most 
exploitive of their established products or services.  As a result, product development, if 
it occurs, is usually accomplished as an extension [exploitation] of current products or 
services in closely related areas (Miles & Snow, 1978).  In summary, the Defender’s 
entrepreneurial problem entails the creation of a narrow, stable domain through a limited 
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combination of products and markets; an emphasis on protecting their domain from 
competitors; a tendency to ignore external developments; and minimal [new] product 
development.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Organizations with a high exploitative and a low 
explorative orientation will exhibit a Defender strategic type. 
 
Conversely, when an organization’s primary focus is finding [exploring] new 
products and markets, they are characterized as the Prospector archetype (Miles & Snow, 
1978).  For the Prospector organization, maintaining a reputation for innovation in 
product and market development may be as important, and potentially even more 
important, than the achievement of abnormal rents.  In fact, because of the Prospector’s 
emphasis on exploring new products and markets, and the inevitable increase in failure 
rates associated with such exploration, Prospectors often find it more difficult to 
consistently achieve the profit levels associated with the more efficient Defenders (Miles 
& Snow, 1978).   
In comparison to the Defender, whose product offering and domain are narrow 
and stable, the Prospector’s domain is typically broad and in a continuous state of 
evolution.  The Prospector is often in a mode of near perpetual exploration.  This 
continual addition of new products or markets, often accompanied by retrenchment in 
other domains, gives the Prospector’s products and markets the appearance of fluidity 
(Miles & Snow, 1978). 
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In order to thrive, and even survive, Prospectors need to develop and maintain the 
ability to continuously monitor a wide variety of environmental conditions, trends and 
events.  Because these scanning [exploration] activities need to extend beyond the 
organization’s existing domain, Prospectors are often the creators of change in their 
respective industries (Miles & Snow, 1978).  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  Organizations with a high explorative and a low 
exploitative orientation will exhibit a Prospector strategic type. 
 
Building on this logic, the failure of an organization to achieve a balance between 
exploration and exploitation can result in the organization being susceptible to either the 
risk of obsolescence or the risk of failure to appropriate.  On the other hand, striking a 
closer balance between the two orientations enables an organization to avoid, or at least 
better manage such risks (Cao et al., 2009).  Miles and Snow (1978) posit that the 
aforementioned Defenders and Prospectors reside at opposing ends of the same 
continuum.  To reconcile this, they identify the Analyzer, as a unique combination of the 
Defender and Prospector archetypes.  In their parlance, the Analyzer is an organizational 
type focusing on the minimization of risk while simultaneously maximizing returns 
(Miles & Snow, 1978). 
Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) support the view that exploration and exploitation 
are mutually exclusive states.  In their view, organizations may use sequential attention or 
rhythmic pacing to shift between exploration and exploitation.  In their longitudinal study 
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of Intel, Burgelman and Grove (2007) reported findings supporting Brown and 
Eisenhardt’s (1997) contention. 
This study concurs with Gupta et al’s. (2006) view that exploration and 
exploitation may take place in complementary domains, (e.g., technologies and markets 
that do not necessarily compete for the same resources).  This view is central to the 
combined dimension conceptualization posited by Cao et al. (2009) that exploration and 
exploitation are not in fundamental competition.  These exploratory and exploitive 
processes can be supportive of one another and may, in fact, help leverage the effects of 
one to the other.  Utilizing the lenses of dynamic capabilities, focusing on ambidexterity, 
explorative and exploitive activities can be aggressively and simultaneously pursued.  
That is, these two conditions are not bi-polar, but rather orthogonal states. 
A high degree of exploitative effort can improve an organization’s effectiveness 
in exploring new knowledge, as well as developing resources in support of new products, 
services and markets.  Cao et al. (2009) posit that because of the repeated use of existing 
knowledge and resources, the organization is more aware as to where in the organization 
this knowledge and resources reside, coupled with a deeper understanding of their 
functionality.  As a result, the organization is more capable of initiating various 
reconfigurations of existing knowledge and resources already under its control (Fleming, 
2001; Kogut & Zander, 1992).   
The Analyzer’s approach to the entrepreneurial problem is to locate and develop 
[explore] new product and market opportunities while simultaneously maintaining 
[exploiting] a stable core of products and customers.  As such, Miles and Snow (1978) 
posit that the Analyzer’s domain is a mixture of products and markets, with some in a 
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stable environment and others in a changing one.  Similarly, proficiency in an 
organization’s exploratory processes can enhance its ability to participate in successful 
exploitation.  In this regard, being successful in exploring in one new product or 
technological domain can enhance exploitive efforts in a complementary domain.  
Additionally, successful exploration can improve the economies of an organization’s 
existing exploitive activities.  This can occur because as the organization internalizes 
more outside knowledge and resources through exploration, its exploration takes place 
within a larger sphere of competencies, so that increasingly efficient routines and 
processes can be utilized on a larger scale (Cao et al., 2009). 
In summary, Cao et al. (2009) propose that because organizational knowledge and 
resources can often be effectively leveraged across both types of orientations, explorative 
and exploitative processes can complement each other and lead to enhanced 
organizational performance.  Murray and O’Mahoney (2007) further posit that there is a 
middle ground, a cumulative approach.  The cumulative approach is usually represented 
as innovation generated by one organization and added to or adapted by another for either 
external market consumption or internal use.  Miles and Snow (2003) identified such 
organizations, often labeled as ‘second movers’, as residing between the extremes they 
identify as Defenders (H1a) and Prospectors (H1b).  This third organizational orientation 
combines the salient behaviors of the other two by minimizing risk while maximizing the 
opportunity for increased profits.  The challenge for these organizations is in locating and 
exploiting new product and market opportunities while simultaneously maintaining a 
stable and sustainable core of products and customers.  These organizations seem poised 
and ready to move rapidly towards any new product or market that has recently received 
55 
 
 
some degree of acceptance.  In essence, these organizations are avid followers of change.  
Much of these organizations’ growth is derived through market penetration, because the 
organizations’ basic orientation focuses on its traditional product – market base.   
Of the three archetypes identified by Miles and Snow, the Analyzer presents the 
best representation of ambidextrous dynamic capabilities. Keeping with Gupta et al’s. 
(2006) approach, it is argued that the Analyzer’s orientation exemplifies the synchronous 
pursuit of both exploration and exploitation. Research in this arena suggests that if 
successful in this domain, a substantial amount of growth may also result from product or 
market development.  This set of conditions leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1c:  Organizations with a high combined explorative / 
exploitative orientation will exhibit the Analyzer strategic type. 
 
Each of the three previous strategic archetypes; Prospector, Analyzer, and 
Defender, regardless of their respective orientation, exhibit one common characteristic, 
that of being consistent in the pursuit of their orientation.  The fourth archetype, the 
Reactor, is consistent only in its inconsistent and unstable reactions and adjustments to 
their environment.  These organizations have an inability to marshal consistent response 
mechanisms when faced with changes in the environment.  Potential sources for these 
organizations’ apparent inconsistencies, include; (1) management’s inability to articulate 
a viable organizational strategy; (2) a strategy may be articulated, but the requisite 
technologies [the engineering problem], structures and processes [the administrative 
problem] are not appropriately linked, or (3) management blindly adheres to a particular 
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strategy rendered impotent by changes in the external environment (Miles et al., 1978).  
The Reactor’s ultimate failing is its inability to consistently pursue an explorative focus 
[the Prospector], an exploitive focus [the Defender], or some systematically crafted blend 
of the two [the Analyzer].   
The Reactor frequently falls into the unpleasant cycle of responding 
inappropriately to environmental change and uncertainty.  The Reactor’s subsequent 
performance is typically poor, and as a result, these organizations become increasingly 
reluctant to act aggressively in the future (Conant et al., 1990).  The Reactor’s response to 
the entrepreneurial problem tends be uneven, transient, with opportunistic thrusts, and 
coping postures that exhibit a proclivity towards issue-dominated reactions in a sporadic 
manner.  The result of this behavior is hasty and often thoughtless change.  In keeping 
with the view posited by Hughes and Morgan (2008), the Reactor archetype exhibits no 
clear strategic rudder, and as a result, responds to external competitive events when 
forced, and most likely in an inconsistent and unstable manner.  In fact, when compared 
to the other archetypes, the Reactor is best categorized by a low propensity for both 
explorative and exploitive behavior.  This set of conditions leads to the following 
hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 1d :  Organizations with low explorative, low exploitative, and 
a low or inconsistent blend of the two orientations will exhibit the Reactor 
strategic type.  
 
Figure 2 visually depicts hypotheses H1a through H1d. 
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Figure 2:  Entrepreneurial Problem 
 
Engineering Problem 
Before proceeding onto the engineering problem, it should be noted that there is a 
fine, if not, subtle difference between the entrepreneurial and engineering problems 
defined by Miles and Snow (1978).  Examination of the two reveals that the 
entrepreneurial problem is primarily focused on the actual product(s) or service(s) 
brought to the market by the organization.  The engineering problem is focused on the 
actual processes, and the degree of innovation, employed by the organization in 
delivering those products or services.  In essences, the entrepreneurial problem examines 
the “what”, whereas the engineering problem is orientated towards the “how”.  Stated 
another way, the engineering problems is the means to the entrepreneurial problem’s 
ends. 
The engineering problem involves the creation of systems that operationalize 
management’s approach to the problems found in the entrepreneurial domain (Miles & 
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to produce and deliver its products and services to the market.  In essence, this is the 
organization’s ability to innovate in response to changing environments.  Schumpeter 
(1934) identified five different types of innovation:  new products, new production 
methods, new markets, new sources of supply, and new forms of organization.  It is the 
new production methods and new sources of supply that most closely fit within the 
engineering problem identified by Miles and Snow.  New products and new markets fit 
within the domain of the entrepreneurial problem addressed in the previous section 
whereas new organizational forms, addressed in the next section, fits the administrative 
problem. 
Innovation has long been considered a complex phenomenon that includes both 
technical and non-technical aspects as well as products and processes (Anderson & King, 
1993; Damanpour & Evan, 1984; Trotterdell et al., 2002).  In recognition of this 
complexity, Armbruster et al. (2008) separate innovation into four types: (1) technical 
product innovation, (2) non-technical services, (3) technical process innovation, and (4) 
non-technical process innovation, often identified as organizational innovation. 
Innovation entails the processes of proposing, adopting, developing, and 
implementing a new idea as it relates to a product, process, policy, program or service 
(McAdam & Galloway, 2005).  In keeping with Damanpour and Evan (1984) and further 
supported by Armbruster et al. (2008), innovation manifests itself as new managerial and 
working concepts and practices within the organization.  It is the strategic capabilities of 
innovation, coupled with organizational learning, that allow organizations to create 
wealth and develop a competitive advantage. 
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Engineering innovation can be delineated into structural and procedural 
components.  Structural innovation affects the responsibilities, accountabilities, chain of 
command, information flows, and hierarchical and divisional structures of the 
organization’s functional activities.  Procedural innovation impacts the processes, 
routines and overall operations of the organization and results in the change or 
implementation of new processes within the organization.  Procedural innovation can 
influence the speed, flexibility and adaptability of production and quality (Armbruster et 
al., 2008). 
This view of engineering-related innovation is further expanded upon by Crossan 
and Apaydin (2010) as: 
“production or adoption, assimilation, and exploitation of a value-added 
novelty in economic and social spheres; renewal and enlargement of 
products, services, and markets; development of new methods of 
production; and establishment of new management systems.  It is both a 
process and an outcome” (p. 1155).  
 
These various views present the duality of innovation in that it can be both internally 
conceived and externally adopted.  This duality view of innovation is supported by 
presenting the concept as extending beyond a purely creative process (exploration) by 
including the dimension of application (exploitation).  Adopting this view allows for 
measuring innovation, regardless of specific focus, orthogonally.  This approach 
recognizes that an organization’s innovation activities will occur somewhere on the 
intersection between radical and incremental.  In keeping with this view, organizations 
exhibiting innovation activities predominately along any one of the orthogonal 
dimensions leads to the following two hypotheses: 
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H2a:  Organizations pursuing radical innovation will exhibit the 
Prospector strategic type. 
 
H2b:  Organizations pursuing incremental innovation activities will 
exhibit the Defender strategic type. 
 
Ambidextrous organizations pursuing both radical and incremental innovation are 
faced with a challenging, if not daunting task (Jansen et al., 2005).  To successfully 
pursue this strategy, those organizations must develop combinations of organizational 
characteristics and competencies that act in a complementary and reinforcing manner 
(Sheremata, 2000).  The issue surrounding this strategy is the apparent tension between 
the ability to both explore and exploit based upon the belief that experimentation with 
new alternatives negatively impacts improvements in existing procedures and processes.  
The alternative, but equally espoused position is that improvements in existing activities 
diminish the attractiveness of experimenting with new ones (Levitt & March, 1988; 
Taylor & Greve, 2006). 
While some organizations may emphasize one approach over the other (e.g., 
exploration over exploitation), the notion of ambidexterity suggests that organizations 
that do not attempt to achieve a dual goal of radical and incremental innovation activities 
may suffer long term issues in performance (Vorhies, Orr, & Bush, 2011).  This view 
supports the contention that organizations need to maintain a balance between 
exploration and exploitation, or need to be able to adapt quickly from one orientation to 
the other.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
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H2c:  Organizations that simultaneously pursue radical innovation and 
incremental innovation will exhibit the Analyzer strategic type. 
 
The final hypothesis in this section deals with those organizations that exhibit no 
consistent or specific orientation towards either explorative or exploitive innovation, but 
rather appear to suffer from an apparent lack of focus.  As a result of this condition, these 
organizations tend to underperform.  Organizations meeting this characterization are what 
Miles and Snow (1978) would classify as Reactors.  As such, the hypothesis is: 
 
H2d:  Organizations that are erratic, even irrational, in the pursuit of either 
radical or incremental innovation will exhibit the Reactor strategic type. 
 
Figure 3 visually depicts the hypotheses H2a through H2d: 
Figure 3:  Engineering Problem 
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Administrative Problem  
The administrative problem is concerned with the organization’s ability to 
establish management and planning systems in support of the entrepreneurial and 
engineering problems.  The problem focuses around two principle loci; first is the 
reduction of uncertainty, second is the formulation and implementation of processes 
enabling the organization to evolve, in essence pursuing a path of ambidextrous dynamic 
capabilities.  The reduction of uncertainty is addressed by establishing rational and stable 
activities focused on directly facilitating the achievement of the entrepreneurial and 
engineering problems. 
The organizational structure, in terms of processes and procedures, addresses how 
the organization will go about accomplishing its goals and objectives.  The premise 
purported by Miles and Snow (1984, p. 10) is “successful organizations achieve strategic 
fit with their market and [thereby] support their strategies with appropriately designed 
[organizational] structures and management processes.”  In order to achieve these goals, 
an organization must develop compatibility and consistency among their strategies.  
Additionally, they must be consistent in their implementation of the strategies at the 
various levels of the organization.  Expanding upon this view of integration, Henderson 
and Venkatraman (1993) argued that alignment throughout the organization is critical to 
maximizing economic performance.  Gibson and Birkinshaw (2002) break this concept of 
integration and alignment into two elements, contextual and structural. 
The achievement of a level of contextual integration supporting superior 
economic performance requires the coordination or alignment of three structures within 
the organization.  These three generic structural foci are identified by Schumpeter (1934) 
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as a form of [organizational] innovation.  The foci are later expanded upon by Jansen et 
al. (2005) as; (1) formalization, the extent to which the organization’s rules, procedures, 
instructions and communications are codified or written down, (2) routinization, the 
degree to which organizational tasks are invariable, repetitious and seldom affected by 
unexpected or novel events, and (3) connectedness, the extent that individuals in the 
organization are networked to each other and within the organizational hierarchy. 
Formalization and routinization both focus on the reduction of variance within the 
organization.  A strong orientation on these two forms of alignment often result in the 
organization codifying best practices, thus making them easier to exploit, as well as to 
apply and reapply.  As a result, they facilitate the diffusion of organizational knowledge.  
Organizational formalization and routinization enhances exploitive innovation by 
encouraging the improvement of current products, services and processes.  A resulting 
consequence is that organizations with highly developed formalization and routinization 
may be less effective in the explorative innovation front. 
Connectedness deals with the network, both internal and external, that the 
organization has for the acquisition and dissemination of newly acquired knowledge and 
insights.  Organizations supporting significant or densely connected networks allow 
individuals within the organization to develop high levels of knowledge while 
simultaneously refining existing products and services.  Densely connected organizations 
support both exploratory and exploitive innovation “by… enabling organic features while 
their efficiency and control requirements are supported by collaborative, shared control 
afforded by enabling bureaucratic features” (Adler & Borys, 1996 p. 79).  Organizations 
that simultaneously pursue exploratory and exploitive innovation need to develop 
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organizational combinations that act in a complementary and reinforcing manner 
(Sheremata, 2000).  
The greater the level of connectedness the organization has, particularly with 
external sources of knowledge and information, the greater the likelihood that the 
organization will have an explorative view of their environment and market(s).  The 
reciprocal orientation, exploitive, is more likely to be the result of a more inward looking 
view.  Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) suggest that ambidextrous organizational structures 
support engagement in both explorative and exploitive orientated activities.  The 
ambidextrous organization is characterized as supporting the interaction between 
formalization, routinization and connectedness.  These organizations manage to combine 
these often contradictory mechanisms and simultaneously increase both explorative and 
exploitive innovative activities. 
The structural component of the administrative problem involves the actual 
reporting relationships within the organization and how decision making authority is 
dispersed within the organization.  This component identifies how centric or dispersed 
the actual decision making authority resides in the organization.  As the degree of 
centralization diminishes, the degree of coordination needs to correspondingly increase.  
The result is a difference between alignment and adaptation.  In order to optimize 
decision making capability, the organization needs to ensure the appropriate balance 
between these two facets. 
Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) conceptualize adaptability as the organization’s 
ability to reconfigure it activities, to be explorative, in response to the rapidly changing 
demands in the environment.  Alignment measures the cohesiveness among all the 
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activities of the organization, how the activities are exploited, in the achievement of the 
organization’s common goals. 
Keeping with this conceptualization, this orientation is most often accomplished 
by exploring the development of new products, services or markets.  This leads to the 
following hypothesis:  
 
H3a:  Organizations that are high in adaptive orientation will exhibit the 
Prospector strategic type. 
 
Alignment is the organizations propensity for cohesiveness, to exploit existing 
competencies, products, services and markets in the achievement of its goals.  This leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
 
H3b:  Organizations that are high in alignment orientation will exhibit the 
Defenders strategic type. 
 
A balanced response, between adaptiveness and alignment, reflects an 
organization’s ambidextrous orientation towards its products and services as well as the 
current and potential markets it serves. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
H3c:  Organizations exhibiting both high adaptive and alignment 
(ambidextrous) orientations will exhibit the Analyzer strategic type. 
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Organizations that exhibit no consistent or specific orientation towards either 
adaptiveness or alignment appear to suffer from an apparent lack of management focus.  
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H3d:  Organizations exhibiting inconsistent adaptive and alignment 
orientations will exhibit the Reactor strategic type. 
 
Figure 4 visually depicts the hypotheses H3a through H3d: 
 
Figure 4:  Administrative Problem 
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archetype, be it Prospector, Analyzer, Defender, or Reactor.  Much of the extant literature 
utilizes the lens of a specific function, with the preponderance in the realm of marketing, 
as a proxy for assigning an organization to a specific archetype.  For example, Ruekert 
and Walkers (1987) examined the interaction between marketing and research and 
development (R&D) personnel, and found that conflict exists between marketing and 
R&D personnel in an organization when business units are pursuing different strategies.  
McKee, Varadarajan and Pride (1989) examined market volatility and found that the 
relationship between strategic archetype and marketing tactics appears to hold in different 
market environments. Conant et al., (1990) examined marketing competencies and found 
that ‘new service development’ most differentiated the four strategic archetypes. Lastly, 
Slater and Narver (1993) utilized the product-market strategy as the determinant of 
superior profitability for the Prospector, Analyzer and Defender archetypes. 
In the current study it is argued that an organization’s strategic archetype is 
manifested as the aggregation of its specific domain orientations.  Stated otherwise, an 
organization that exhibits strong, consistent and complementary tendencies in each 
problem domain will align with a specific strategic archetype.  Specifically: 
1. Organizations exhibiting high explorative traits, high radical innovation 
and high adaptability will be identified as Prospectors 
2. Organizations exhibiting high exploitative traits, high incremental 
innovation and high alignment will be identified as Defenders 
3. Organizations exhibiting high explorative and exploitative traits, high 
levels of both radical and incremental innovation, and high levels of 
adaptability and alignment will be identified as Analyzers  
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4. Organizations exhibiting low explorative and exploitative traits, low levels 
of both radical and incremental innovation, and low levels of adaptability 
and alignment (i.e., inconsistency among the three problem domains) will 
be identified as Reactors 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H4a:  The more consistent the individual problem domain orientation of 
the organization (entrepreneurial, engineering, and administrative), such 
that each plots on the same relative quadrant, the more likely they are to 
represent the organization’s singular strategic archetype (Prospector, 
Analyzer, Defender or Reactor). 
 
Those organizations that maintain the greatest degree of alignment between the 
three domains and a specific archetype will outperform their competition.  Dynamic 
capabilities suggest that such organizations exhibit a superior capability to migrate and 
reconfigure their resource base towards the on-going creation and maintenance of a 
competitive advantage.  This is in keeping with the position that organizations that best 
evolve and manage their resources and capabilities in a consistent manner will 
outperform their competition.  This leads to the following: 
 
H4b:  Organizations where the three domains align in the same strategic 
archetype (pure) will outperform those organizations where the majority 
of the domains do not align (random). 
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 A further examination of the interactions with and between the domains and the 
strategic archetypes reveals that the individual archetypes are neither immutable in their 
boundaries nor mutually exclusive states.  In reality, the four archetypes postulated by 
Miles and Snow (1978) may be actualized as organizational tendencies as opposed to 
absolutes.  When these archetypes are viewed through the lenses of dynamic capabilities 
and ambidexterity, an organization’s strategic archetype identification becomes more 
fluid. 
The ambidextrous organization, by definition is one that simultaneously pursues 
both explorative and exploitative activities, and whose long run success requires the 
pursuit of both these activities (Abernathy, 1978; Boumgarden et al., 2012; Ghemawat & 
Costa, 1993; March, 1991; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1997).  “The basic problem confronting 
an organization is to engage in sufficient exploitation to ensure current viability, and at 
the same time, devote enough energy to exploration to ensure future viability” (March, 
1991 p. 105).  The position espoused here is that organizational performance increases as 
exploitation and exploration also increase.  High levels of both exploitation and 
exploration, with periods of simultaneity optimize the generation of performance 
(Boumgarden et al., 2012). 
As discussed earlier, one view of ambidexterity posits a balance between 
exploration and exploitation related activities with the establishment of the often 
cumbersome, hybrid structured organization (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008).  Another 
approach is that these two states do not simultaneously coexist, but rather they exist 
individually in a static and discrete manner (2002).  A third, and emerging, view is that of 
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‘organizational vacillation’ which “emphasizes dynamically achieving high levels of both 
exploration and exploitation by temporally and sequentially alternating between . . . 
exploration and exploitation” (p. 588).  In this view, management’s charter is to optimize 
long run performance by vacillating between the organizational modes and orientations 
and thus, leverage exploitative and explorative activities at levels beyond that achieved 
by static choice.  A fundamental assumption in the organizational vacillation approach is 
that as these shifts occur, the organization’s level of exploration and exploitation both 
increase and dissipate as a result of inertia (Boumgarden et al., 2012). 
The introduction of the concept of organizational vacillation, as presented in the 
current study, furthers the argument of a more fluid state in the ambidextrous 
organization.  The introduction of organizational vacillation presents the view that high 
performance is achievable by dynamically vacillating between levels of exploration and 
exploitation with on average, an inconsistent balance.  This balance will ultimately skew, 
even ever so slightly, towards either exploitation or exploration.  In this light, 
ambidexterity is a strategic orientation that transects both the Reactor and Analyzer 
strategic archetypes.  By their very nature, ambidextrous organizations exhibit a plurality 
in orientation.  Figure 5 visually represents the concept. 
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Figure 5:  Strategic Archetypes 
 
 
Of the four archetypes, the Analyzer and Reactor come closest to resembling the 
ambidextrous organization.  The Analyzer seeks to both explore new products and market 
opportunities (similar to the Prospectors archetype) while simultaneously exploiting core 
skills, products and markets (similar to the Defender archetype).  The Analyzer will often 
rapidly follow the Prospector, thus being labeled a ‘second mover’.  The Reactor is more 
often seen as an ad hoc opportunist, flitting between explorative and exploitative 
activities with no apparent plan or consistency.   
The Miles and Snow typology (1978) as originally presented and commonly 
accepted, view each of the proposed strategic archetypes as a static, immutable state for 
an organization.  However, when deploying the lens of dynamic capabilities and further 
framing it with Boumgarden et al’s., (2012) argument for organizational vacillation, the 
static, immutability of the strategic archetypes warrants further examination.  Dynamic 
capabilities entail the organization’s acquisition and deployment of new resources and the 
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and product domains (Eisenhardt, 2000).  Boumgarden et al’s., (2012) theory of 
organizational vacillation posits that optimizing an organization’s long term performance 
requires the ability to vacillate, or shift, between organizational modes and orientations 
thereby leveraging both explorative and exploitative activities.  In the current study 
organizational vacillation is represented as movement between the Prospector and 
Defender archetypes.  This shifting between archetypes is also in keeping with Mintzberg 
and Waters’ (1985) contention that as a result of organizational learning, strategies can 
move along a continuum.  The figure 6 presents this concept. 
 
Figure 6:  Strategic Archetype Continuum
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the resulting archetype.  However, when the vacillation is the result of sporadic and 
random activities, the Reactor is the resulting strategic archetype.  For this reason, it is 
expected that organizations that are identified as members of either the Analyzer or 
Reactor archetype will also exhibit a tendency to exhibit either the Prospector or 
Defender characteristics as vacillation occurs. 
As a result of this observation, it may be more accurate to disaggregate the Miles 
and Snow typology into six rather than four archetypes.  The new proposed archetypes 
are Prospector (P), Prospector / Analyzer (PA), Defender / Analyzer (DA), Defender (D), 
Defender / Reactor (DR), and Prospector / Reactor (PR).  Figure 7 visually presents the 
proposed reconfiguration. 
Figure 7:  Strategic Archetypes and Ambidexterity 
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ambidexterity, such that they exhibit some combination of either the 
Analyzer or Reactor strategic archetype and either a Prospector or 
Defender perspective. 
 
Drivers of the Strategic Archetype  
The focus of this research, to this point, has examined the alignment between the 
three problem domains and the four strategic archetypes.  In order to close the loop in 
regards to the examination, the current study examines the level of influence each of the 
identified problem domains has on the strategic archetypes operationalized by the 
organization.  This examination is taken in the context of the ongoing debate over which 
comes first, structure or strategy. 
The debate over structure and strategy goes back to the findings in Chandler’s 
seminal work, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial 
Enterprise (Chandler, 1962).  The focus of the debate revolves around the temporal 
sequence and importance of the strategy-structure conundrum.  A wide breadth of 
scholars (Amburgey & Dacin, 1994; Donaldson, 1987; Hall & Saias, 1980; Mintzberg, 
1978; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989) have sought to explain the various strategy-
structure configurations with conflicting results (Harris & Ruefli, 2000). 
Chandler (1962) argued that organizational structure follows, or is a function of, 
the organization’s strategy and correspondingly, controls must be aligned with the 
organization’s plans.  The central premise was that the changes in the organization’s 
strategy lead to changes in administration – structure (Harris & Ruefli, 2000).  In 
Chandler’s (1962) view, strategy was “the determination of the basic long term goals and 
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objectives of an enterprise, and adoption of courses of action and the allocation of 
resources necessary for carrying out these goals” (p. 13); and therefore structure provides 
“the design of organizations through which the enterprise is administered” (p. 14).  
Chandler (1962) further argued: 
“Strategic growth resulted from an awareness of the opportunities and 
needs – created by changing populations, income, and technology – to 
employ existing or expanding resources more profitably.  A new strategy 
required a new or at least refashioned structure if the enterprise was to be 
operated efficiently” (p. 915) 
 
The opposing view espoused by researchers such as Child (1972), Fredrickson 
(1986), and Galbraith and Nathanson (1979) is that there is no equally major influence 
from structure to strategy.  Many of these theorists posit that strategy follows structure 
because of the constraints imposed by the structure on the strategic options available to 
the organization’s management (Harris & Ruefli, 2000).  Hall and Saias (1980) 
emphasize this point: 
“It is necessary to recognize that in reality structure is the result of a 
complex play of variables other than strategy; culture, values, the past and 
present functioning of the organization, its history of success and failure, 
the psychology and sociological consequences of technological 
development, and so on.  Structure, then, assumes a political content in the 
same way as strategy, and there is no reason to subordinate one to the 
other” (p. 161)  
 
Harris and Ruefli (2000) suggested that the debate may in fact be one of a difference 
without relevance.  That the causal linkage between strategy and structure change is most 
likely reciprocal, and to a degree, contingent upon the point of view of the observer.  
The current study adopts the order that Miles and Snow (1978) presented and 
discussed the three problem domains and the relative significance of each.  In keeping 
with RBV, the organization’s orientation toward each of the three problem domains is 
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assets that management must leverage in order to achieve a competitive advantage.  As 
such and within the context of the Miles and Snow typology, the three problems can be 
viewed as the structural side of the debate; in so much as they ultimately influence the 
four archetypes, which can be viewed as the strategy side.  This view through the RBV 
lens is in keeping with Chandler’s (1962) conceptualization of structure as an 
administrative governor of the organization’s strategies.  In this sense, the structural 
elements of the three problems serve as a fulcrum upon which the organization’s strategic 
orientation and subsequent archetype pivot.  This position is also supported from the 
perspective of ‘strategic coalignment’, which deals with how the organization aligns or 
configures its internal resources and structures to fit with its external environment 
(Veliyath & Srinivasan, 1995).  Its principal elements address the organizational impact 
of external environmental conditions (i.e., market and product), internal organizational 
elements (i.e., strategic resource allocation and utilization), and organizational 
arrangements (i.e., structures, systems, and culture) (Doty, Glick, & Huber, 1993; Miller, 
1990). 
Overlaying the Miles and Snow typology (1978) on the strategic coalignment 
model provides a means for beginning to determine the more nuanced nature of the 
relationship between the three problem domains and the four strategic archetypes.  
Accordingly, the entrepreneurial problem is suggested to be the first decision that an 
organization needs to reconcile.  Recall, the entrepreneurial problem seeks to resolve the 
issues of the organization’s interaction with its external environment.  It is in essence the 
basis for the organization’s strategy formulation, in that it establishes the organization’s 
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decisions regarding not only what product or market domain to operate within, but how it 
intends to position itself.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H5a:  The entrepreneurial problem is related to the organization’s strategic 
archetype. 
 
The engineering problem reflects management’s decisions regarding the 
configuration of the organization’s resources in response to the achievement of the 
organization’s desired external outcomes (entrepreneurial problem) (Doty et al., 1993;  
Venkatraman, 1989) .  In discussing RBV, Barney (1991) asserts that in order be 
competitive, the organization’s resources need to be both valuable and rare. Sirmon et al., 
(2007) argue that resource management, the bundling and leveraging of the 
organization’s resources, purpose is to facilitate the achievement of value creation for the 
customer.  The engineering problem addresses issues surrounding the utilization of the 
resources necessary to achieve a solution to the entrepreneurial problem.  How those 
resources are bundled and leveraged has the potential for altering the achievement of the 
organization’s entrepreneurial problem.  As a result, the engineering problem presents the 
potential for significantly influencing the interaction between the organization’s 
entrepreneurial problem and its strategic archetype.  This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H5b:  The engineering problem mediates the relationship between the 
entrepreneurial problem and the organization’s strategic archetype. 
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The administrative problem deals with the internal arrangements of the 
organization inherent to the organization (i.e., its systems, structure, leadership and 
culture).  The administrative problem addresses the supporting network of people and 
processes within the organization that facilitate the acquisition, deployment and 
utilization of the engineering problem’s resources required to achieve the entrepreneurial 
problem solution.  Moreover, while the administrative problem is argued to impact the 
operationalization of both the entrepreneurial and engineering problem, the actual level of 
influence it ultimately has on either the relationship between the entrepreneurial and 
engineering problems, or the engineering problem and the organization’s strategic 
archetype may be more indirect and therefore serve to moderate the relationships.  
Understanding these potential interactions is important because an organization executes 
its operations in the way they organize their structure (Lavie et al., 2010).   
Structure defines how power, resources and responsibilities are allocated across 
the organization.  Alignment, or what Burns and Wholey (1993) refer to as mechanistic 
structures, support routine operations, functional specialization, and formal duties, 
responsibilities and power.  Adaptive or organic structures provide for less ridged and 
more flexible organizations.  The notion of balance between exploration and exploitation 
[ambidexterity] underscores the importance of providing for the simultaneous capabilities 
of alignment and adaptability.  Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) suggest that an 
organization can effectively balance activities by nurturing an appropriate organizational 
context that blends, stretch discipline, support and trust.  Nurturing well designed systems 
[administrative problem] enables simultaneous alignment and adaptability.  Extending 
this argument, one would expect to see some interaction effect (moderation) evident in 
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the relationship between the engineering problem and the organization’s strategic 
archetype 
Hypothesis 5c and 5d seek to ascertain, to what extent if any, the influence of the 
administrative problem on the organization’s strategic archetype.  This leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H5c:  The administrative problem moderates the relationship between the 
entrepreneurial problem and the organization’s strategic archetype. 
 
H5d:  The administrative problem moderates the relationship between the 
engineering problem and the organization’s strategic archetype. 
 
Figure 8 presents the model of these hypotheses: 
Figure 8:  Drivers of Strategic Archetypes 
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CHAPTER 4:  METHODS 
To determine the proper sample size Hair et al. (2010) suggests a minimum ratio 
of five responses and 15 to 20 observations as the desired level for each independent 
variable.  Based upon these guidelines a sample of 150 organizations would be sufficient.  
The final sample used in the study was collected utilizing the professional services 
division of Qualtric.  To ensure that a minimum sample size of 150 was achieved, 984 
companies were initially approached to participate.  These respondents were screened 
against two qualifying criteria.  First, the respondent had to have meaningful involvement 
in the development of their organization’s strategy making activities.  Second, those 
individuals had to indicate further that they held either an executive or senior level 
position in the organization (e.g., President, CEO, General Manager, or Vice President).  
Out of the initial 984 respondents, approximately 51% successfully passed the screening 
process thereby leaving the study with 503 respondents providing usable data, Table 4 
presents the industry distribution of the sample.   
Further analysis of the responding companies shows that 70% had less than 500 
full time employees (FTEs), with 45% having less than 10 FTEs.  Only 18% of the 
companies had stock that was issued on a recognized public exchange (e.g., NYSE, 
AMEX, and NADQ), with the remainder of the sample being privately held companies.  
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Industry type, as derived from NAICS codes, is well dispersed among the 20 major 
NAICS sectors. For example, 14% of the companies were classified in professional, 
scientific and technical service 13% in retail trade; and 11% in other services (except 
public administration).  With respect to company age, 58% have been in existence for 20 
years or less, with 30% in existence 10 years or less.  Geographically, the companies 
represent all 50 states, with the five largest states by population also being the states with 
the largest number of respondents (i.e., 16% in California, 8% in New York, 7% in both 
Florida and Texas, and 5% in Illinois). 
Table 4:  Industry Distribution 
 Number  
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting 16  
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil & Gas Extraction 6  
Utilities 8  
Construction 39  
Manufacturing 39  
Wholesale Trade 17  
Retail Trade 63  
Transportation & Warehousing 21  
Information 32  
Financial & Insurance 28  
Real Estate and Rental & Leasing 17  
Professional, Scientific, & Technical Services 68  
Management of Companies & Enterprises 13  
Administrative & Support & Waste Management & Remediation Services 6  
Educational Services 11  
Health care & Social Services 25  
Arts, Entertainment, & Recreation 25  
Accommodation & Food Service 7  
Other Services (except Public Administration) 56  
Public Administration 6  
Total 503  
Measures 
All constructs are measured using previously published scales. Of those multi-
item scales, each has shown acceptable validity and reliability in prior applications.  
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Dependent Variables  
The four strategic archetypes were originally conceptualized as the result of the 
qualitative studies performed by Miles and Snow (1978).  Conant et al. (1990) developed 
a multi-item scale for measuring the Miles and Snow strategic types and Desarbo et al. 
(2005) modified this scale into a more generic measure.  The resulting questions are 
divided into the three problem domains of entrepreneurial, engineering and 
administrative decisions.  The current study extends this approach by utilizing a series of 
related questions (Questions 4 through 14 on the survey instrument shown in Appendix 
1), each representing varying facets of the three problem domains, to identify 
organizational archetype.  
To assign companies to an archetype, Conant et al. (1990) and later Desarbo et al. 
(2005) utilized a modified ‘majority rule’ approach.  The current study employed a 
similar ‘majority rule’ approach whereby an organization was classified as a Prospector 
or Defender when there was a clear majority.  In cases where no majority was evident, 
the default was to be classified as either an Analyzer or Reactor.  Organizations were the 
Analyzer designation was most evident were classified as such, with the remaining be 
classified as Reactors.  
Performance 
Performance – Utilizing the work first developed by Gupta and Govindarajan 
(1986) and later used by Covin, Prescott and Slevin (1990), performance was measured 
utilizing 7-point Likert scale (where 1 = much worse to 7 = much improved) covering the 
organization’s performance over the last 36 months  in terms of growth in sales, growth 
in profit, growth in market share, return on equity, and return on total assets (Lubatkin et 
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al., 2006) (Questions 22 on the survey instrument shown in Appendix 1 ). While it is 
recognized that objective measures of performance may be preferred, they often are 
either not publicly available or considered proprietary by the organization.  Wall et al., 
(2004) suggest that as a result of their studies, where both convergent and discriminant 
validity were confirmed, subjective measures of performance are a good and meaningful 
proxy for objective measures.  Finally, absolute financial data does not always compare 
well across different industries (Covin et al., 1990). 
Independent Variables  
Entrepreneurial Domain 
The entrepreneurial domain is a construct that often results from the dynamic 
interaction of exploration and exploitation (Benner & Tushman, 2003) wherein 
exploration and exploitation can be examined along their proximity to the organization’s 
technology and product trajectory and the organization’s existing customers and market 
segments (Questions in grouping 15 on the survey instrument shown in Appendix 1). The 
measure of ambidexterity that was originally developed by Cao et al. (2009) and He and 
Wong (2004) was used in this study.  To provide greater precision, Cao et al. (2009) 
operationalized ambidexterity using two distinct dimensions; the Balanced Dimension 
(BD) and the Combined Dimension (CD). The BD examines the balance or relative 
magnitudes of explorative and exploitative related activities, and is calculated as the 
absolute difference between the exploration and exploitative.  The CD, which examines 
the combined magnitude of exploration and exploitation, was calculated by multiplying 
the mean-centered values for both the explorative and exploitative variables.  The BD 
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was used in this study because, as expressed by Cao et al. (2009), it provides for a clearer 
representation of the position of the organization’s exploration and exploitation activities 
as they relate to the control of performance related risks.   
Engineering Domain 
The engineering domain  is vital to organizational survival and success in that the 
result can often satisfy customers’ needs and requirements more effectively than the 
organization’s existing products or services (Lisboa, Skarmeas, & Lages, 2011; 
Yalcinkaya, Calantone, & Griffith, 2007).  In order to prosper, or even survive, 
organizations typically must excel at both radical and incremental innovation (Tushman 
& O'Reilly, 1996).   
The current study utilized Cheng and Shiu’s (2008) 10-item measure of radical 
(explorative) and incremental (exploitative) innovation adapted from the works of Garcia 
and Calantone (2002), Gatigon et al., (2002), and Song and Montoya-Weiss (1998) 
(Questions in grouping 16 on the survey instrument shown in Appendix 1). 
Administrative Domain 
Administrative domain is the organization’s alignment and consistency between 
its structure, orientation, and strategies.  The two scales (structural and contextual) 
developed by Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) was used to measure alignment and 
adaptability (Questions in grouping 17 on the survey instrument shown in Appendix 1). 
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Control Variables. 
Based on existing research, we considered four control variables that thought to 
influence ambidexterity, strategic type, and organizational performance - organization 
size, company age, ownership structure, and industry.   
Organization size – It is often assumed that larger organizations have more 
resources available to pursue a variety of opportunities.  Firm size was measured using 
the natural log of the total number of full time employees (FTEs) at the time of the study 
(Covin, Green, & Slevin, 2006). 
Organization age – During the life of an organization it is possible for it to 
transition between the various strategic archetypes.  Organization age was measured by 
the number of years since the organization’s inception date (Covin et al., 2006). 
Ownership structure – One or more of the variables of interest in the study may 
be affected by whether the organization is public (shares are traded on a public exchange) 
or private (shares are either not available for trade or are only available on a privately 
maintained buy / sell listing).  A dummy variable was created to indicate ownership 
structure (1 = private and 0 = public). 
Industry Classification Code –Using the North American Industry Classification 
Code (NAICS), companies were grouped by the primary classifications of construction, 
government, manufacturing, retail trade, services, wholesale trade, and other.  This 
control was considered because to date, the Miles and Snow typology has been examined 
in diverse industry settings (Conant et al., 1990) and it is possible that industry may 
influence the dominance (or lack thereof) of one strategic type over the others. 
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Pilot Test 
The initial survey instrument was distributed to 8 business executives representing 
diverse backgrounds and experience.  The executives were asked to evaluate the 
instrument’s ease of use (navigation) and readability.  Additionally, they were asked to 
determine the amount of time required to complete the instrument.  Their feedback 
resulted in a few minor changes in the instrument, mostly reflecting issues of readability. 
The entire instrument was pilot tested on a sample drawn, utilizing distribution 
lists, from two different groups, the Amarillo Chamber of Commerce and the Amarillo 
Small Business Development Center.  In addition, an initial sample was also drawn by 
the Qualtric Professional Services Division.  The data was analyzed utilizing IBM PASW 
(SPSS) statistics.  A reliability analysis (Cronbach’s Alpha) was run to access the 
consistency of the items used in the various scales.  Results confirmed that measures in 
the survey were both reliable and valid. 
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CHAPTER 5:  RESULTS 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics, correlations and reliabilities of the key 
variables.  A set of analyses employing the multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) 
methodology were used to test hypotheses H1a through H3d. Each set of analysis 
examined two separate, but related independent variables - explorative and exploitative 
orientation, radical and incremental innovation, and adaptive and alignment orientation, 
as predictors of an organization’s strategic orientation.  The dependent variable, strategic 
orientation, is comprised of four groups (i.e., Prospector, Analyzer, Defender and 
Reactor) thus supporting the use of MDA. 
Table 5:  Correlations and Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Company age
b
 25.13    23.14            
2. Sales 4.75 1.42 .05           
3. Market Share 4.74 1.26 .06 .76
**
          
4. ROE 4.77 1.35 .08 .79
**
 .79
**
         
5. ROA 4.77 1.32 .08 .78
**
 .75
**
 .90
**
        
6. Explorative 3.98 1.39 .13
**
 .23
**
 .15
**
 .11
*
 .17
**
 .84      
7. Exploitative 4.38 1.31 .06 .13
**
 .07 -.01 .04 .65
**
 .88     
8. Radical 
Innovation 5.53 1.46 .06 .41
**
 .45
**
 .43
**
 .42
**
 .37
**
 .21
**
 .84    
9. Incremental 
Innovation 6.19 1.17 -.01 .29
**
 .28
**
 .28
**
 .29
**
 .30
**
 .31
**
 .56
**
 .89   
10. Alignment 4.90 1.86 -.18
*
 -.10
*
 -.16
**
 -.18
**
 -.16
**
 .10
*
 .33
**
 -.23
**
 .16
**
 .78  
11. Adaptiveness 5.67 1.49 -.04 .37
**
 .35
**
 .40
**
 .41
**
 .27
**
 .24
**
 .54
**
 .51
**
 .08 .67 
a 
n = 503; two-tailed test; α on the diagonal; b Logarithm; *p < .05, **p< .01 level (2-tailed). 
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The first set of analysis examined the explorative and exploitative orientation as 
predictors on an organizations strategic archetype.  Table 6 presents the means and 
standard deviations of the strategic archetypes.  Two significant discriminant functions 
were calculated.  For the combination of both discriminant functions (1 through 2) the 
Wilks’ Lambda was computed, λ = .52, χ2 (6, N = 503) = 322.5, p < .01.  After the first 
function is removed, the test of function 2 is still significant, the Wilks’ Lambda for the 
second discriminant function was also significant, λ = .80, χ2 (2, N = 503) = 110.7, p < 
.01, indicating that the overall predictors differentiated among the four strategic 
archetypes (Prospector, Analyzer, Defender, and Reactor).  The effect sizes for the 
discriminant functions are (.59)
2
 = .35 and (.45)
2
 = .20 respectively.  The functions 
accounted for 53% and 25% of the total relationships between predictors and groups.  
The first discriminant function accounted for 68% of the between group (explained) 
variance in the solution, whereas the second discriminant function accounted for 32% of 
the variance.  The correlations between discriminant variables and the first significant 
discriminant function was highest for explorative (.97), while exploitative (.64) was 
highest for the second discriminant function. 
Table 6:  Means and Standard Deviations 
Strategic 
Archetype 
 
Explorative Exploitative 
Radical  
Innovation 
Incremental  
Innovation 
 
Adaptiveness 
 
Alignment 
N M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Prospector 10 4.60 .97 3.70 1.25 5.80 .92 4.80 1.40 5.80 1.14 3.30 .48 
Analyzer 201 4.91 .82 5.20 .61 6.19 1.11 6.72 .78 6.26 1.13 5.55 1.91 
Defender 59 2.73 1.00 4.47 .92 3.68 .80 5.88 .83 4.27 1.35 6.05 1.31 
Reactor 233 4.47 1.38 3.69 1.43 5.43 1.46 5.87 1.32 5.50 1.55 4.13 1.57 
Total 503 3.98 1.39 4.38 1.31 5.53 1.46 6.19 1.17 5.67 1.49 4.90 1.86 
 
The relative strength of the two predictors can be more precisely assessed by 
calculating a potency index.  More specifically, the potency index provides a relative 
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measure among all variables and is indicative of the discriminating power of each (Hair 
et al., 2010) and therefore is useful in depicting the relative rank order of each 
independent variable in predicting group membership.  The potency index for the 
explorative orientation is .662 and .533 for exploitative.   
As shown in Table 7, analysis resulted 70.4% of the sample being correctly 
classified into the theoretically derived strategic groups. In order to cross validate the 
classification results, the “leave-one-out” principle was employed. This approach is 
essentially a jackknife classification procedure whereby one of the cases is omitted in 
deriving the discriminant solution.  Results were identical to the initial classification 
score.   
Table 7:  Classification Results 
Strategic Orientation  
Predicted Group Membership  
Total Prospector Analyzer Defender Reactor 
Original  
Prospector 0 3 0 7 10 
Analyzer 0 176 8 17 201 
Defender 0 6 39 14 59 
Reactor 0 71 23 139 233 
Cross-
validated
b
 
 
Prospector 0 3 0 7 10 
Analyzer 0 176 8 17 201 
Defender 0 6 39 14 59 
Reactor 0 71 23 139 233 
a. 70.4% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
b. Each case is classified by the functions derived from all cases other than that case. 
 
Press’s Q was also calculated as a means to take into account chance agreement.  
Press’s Q tests for the discriminatory power of the classification matrix when compared 
with chance (Hair et al., 2010).  A value of 1430.06 was obtained, significantly exceeding 
the minimum threshold of the chi square value at .01 significant level (6.63) as suggested 
by Hair et al (2010). The four strategic orientations were plotted on a 2 x 2 matrix with 
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the explorative orientation represented on the ‘y’ axis and the exploitative on the ‘x’ axis.  
Each of the two axes has a range of value from 0 to 1 and intersects at 0.  As indicated in 
table 6, the total mean for the explorative and exploitative axes are;  ̅ = 3.98 and  ̅ = 
4.38 respectively.   
The results of the analysis, as discussed, provide support for hypotheses 1a 
through 1d.  Those organizations placing a greater emphasis on an explorative orientation 
over an exploitative orientation tended to exhibit a Prospector strategic orientation.  
Those organizations that place a relative equal emphasis on both an explorative and 
exploitative orientation frequently exhibited an Analyzer strategic orientation. Those 
organizations with a greater emphasis on an exploitative orientation over an explorative 
orientation exhibited a Defender strategic orientation.  Finally, those organizations that 
placed a relatively equal, but diminished emphasis on both the explorative and 
exploitative orientation typically have a Reactor strategic orientation. 
The second set of analysis examined the respective ability of radical and 
incremental innovation to predict an organization’s strategic orientation.  Because the 
dependent variable is the same here as in the previous analysis, two discriminant 
functions were derived.  Table 6 presents the means and standard deviations of the 
strategic archetypes.   
Two significant discriminant functions were calculated.  For the combination of 
both discriminant functions (1 through 2) the Wilks’ Lambda was computed, λ = .63, χ2 
(6, N = 503) = 233.1, p < .01.  After the first function is removed, the test of function 2 is 
still significant, the Wilks’ Lambda for the second discriminant function was also 
significant, λ = .87, χ2 (2, N = 503) = 70.6, p < .01, indicating that the overall predictors 
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differentiated among the four strategic archetypes (Prospector, Analyzer, Defender, and 
Reactor).  The effect sizes for the discriminant functions are (.53)
2
 = .28 and (.36)
2
 = .13 
respectively.  The functions accounted for 39% and 15% of the total relationships 
between predictors and groups.  The first discriminant function accounted for 72% of the 
between group (explained) variance in the solution, whereas the second discriminant 
function accounted for 28% of the variance.  The correlations between discriminant 
variables and the first significant discriminant function was highest for explorative (.98), 
while exploitative (.94) was highest for the second discriminant function. 
The relative strength of the two predictors can be more precisely assessed by 
calculating a potency index.  The overall potency index for the explorative orientation is 
.697 and .333 for exploitative.   
As shown in Table 8, analysis resulted 56.9% of the sample being correctly 
classified into the theoretically derived strategic groups. Results were identical to the 
initial classification score.  A value of 272.29 was obtained for the Press’s Q test, 
significantly exceeding the minimum threshold of the chi square value at .01 significant 
level.   
The four strategic orientations were once again plotted on a 2 x 2 matrix with the 
radical innovation represented on the ‘y’ axis and the incremental innovation on the ‘x’ 
axis.  As indicated in table 6, the total mean for the radical innovation and incremental 
innovation axes are;  ̅ = 5.35 and  ̅ = 6.19 respectively.  These results provide support 
for hypotheses 2a through 2d.  Those organizations placing a greater emphasis on radical 
innovation over an incremental innovation tended to exhibit a Prospector strategic 
orientation whereas those that place a relative equal emphasis on both radical and 
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incremental innovation frequently exhibited an Analyzer strategic orientation. Likewise, 
those organizations placing greater emphasis on incremental innovation over radical 
innovation frequently exhibited a Defender strategic orientation while those placing a 
relatively equal, but diminished emphasis on both radical and incremental innovation 
typically exhibited a Reactor strategic orientation. 
Table 8:  Classification Results 
Strategic Orientation 
Predicted Group Membership  
Total Prospector Analyzer Defender Reactor 
Original  
Prospector 2 1 1 6 10 
Analyzer 0 119 7 75 201 
Defender 0 1 24 34 59 
Reactor 2 74 16 141 233 
Cross-
validated
b
 
 
Prospector 2 1 1 6 10 
Analyzer 0 119 7 75 201 
Defender 0 1 24 34 59 
Reactor 2 74 16 141 233 
a. 56.9% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
b. Each case is classified by the functions derived from all cases other than that case. 
 
The third, and final set of, analysis in this series examined the likely ability of 
adaptive and alignment orientations to predict an organization’s strategic orientation.  
Once more, since there were four groups in the dependent variable, two discriminant 
functions were derived.  Table 6 presents the means and standard deviations of the 
strategic archetypes. 
Two significant discriminant functions were calculated.  For the combination of 
both discriminant functions (1 through 2) the Wilks’ Lambda was computed, λ = .67, χ2 
(6, N = 503) = 199.0, p < .01.  After the first function is removed, the test of function 2 is 
still significant, the Wilks’ Lambda for the second discriminant function was also 
significant, λ = .83, χ2 (2, N = 503) = 92.2, p < .01, indicating that the overall predictors 
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differentiated among the four strategic archetypes (Prospector, Analyzer, Defender, and 
Reactor).  The effect sizes for the discriminant functions are (.44)
2
 = .19 and (.41)
2
 = .17 
respectively.  The functions accounted for 24% and 20% of the total relationships 
between predictors and groups.  The first discriminant function accounted for 54% of the 
between group (explained) variance in the solution, whereas the second discriminant 
function accounted for 46% of the variance.  The correlations between discriminant 
variables and the first significant discriminant function was highest for explorative (.91), 
while exploitative (.95) was highest for the second discriminant function. 
The relative strength of the two predictors can be more precisely assessed by 
calculating a potency index.  The overall potency index for the explorative orientation is 
.527 and .467 for exploitative.   
As shown in Table 9, analysis resulted 64% of the sample being correctly 
classified into the theoretically derived strategic groups. Results were identical to the 
initial classification score.  A value of 412.54 was obtained for the Press’s Q test, 
significantly exceeding the minimum threshold of the chi square value at .01 significant 
level.  The four strategic orientations were once again plotted on a 2 x 2 matrix with 
alignment represented on the ‘y’ axis and the adaptiveness on the ‘x’ axis.  As indicated 
in table 6, the total mean for alignment and adptiveness are;  ̅ = 4.90 and  ̅ = 5.67 
respectively.   
The results from the analysis provide support for three out of four hypotheses.  
Supporting hypotheses 3a, those organizations placing a greater emphasis on an adaptive 
orientation over an alignment orientation were more likely to exhibit a Prospector 
strategic orientation.  Consistent with hypothesis 3c those organizations placing greater 
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emphasis on an alignment orientation over an adaptive orientation typically exhibited a 
Defender strategic orientation. Finally and supporting hypotheses 3d organization that 
placed a relatively equal, but diminished emphasis on both an adaptive and alignment 
orientation tended to exhibit a Reactor strategic orientation.  Hypothesis 3b, which 
predicted that organizations placing a relative equal emphasis on both an adaptive and 
alignment orientation would exhibit an Analyzer strategic orientation, was only partially 
supported.  Here, the mean of the alignment functions exceeded the  ̅= 4.90 cut off by 
0.65, moving it into the territory of the Prospector. 
Table 9:  Classification Results 
Strategic Orientation 
Predicted Group Membership  
Total Prospector Analyzer Defender Reactor 
Original  
Prospector 0 0 0 10 10 
Analyzer 0 124 3 74 201 
Defender 0 17 18 24 59 
Reactor 0 43 9 181 233 
Cross-
validated
b
 
 
Prospector 0 0 0 10 10 
Analyzer 0 124 3 74 201 
Defender 0 17 18 24 59 
Reactor 0 43 9 181 233 
a. 64.2% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
b. Each case is classified by the functions derived from all cases other than that case. 
 
A two-way contingency table analysis was conducted to evaluate whether the 
more consistent the individual domain orientation of the organization (entrepreneurial, 
engineering, and administrative), the more likely it represented an organization with a 
singular strategic archetype, as posited in hypothesis 4a.  Accordingly, a consistent or 
otherwise termed ‘pure’ domain is one where all three of an organization’s domains plot 
on the same quadrant. Table 10 presents the proportion of organizations whose strategic 
archetype was pure Prospector, Analyzer, Defender or Reactor.  As seen, 142 of the 
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sample’s 503 organizations are identified as having a pure domain orientation and a 
corresponding singular strategic archetype.  
Table 10:  Strategic Archetype * Domain Orientation Cross Tabulation 
 
Strategic Archetype 
Domain Orientation  
Random Pure Total 
Prospector 10 0 10 
Analyzer 93 108 201 
Defender 47 12 59 
Reactor 211 22 233 
Total 361 142 503 
 
The results of the analysis indicate there is a significant relationship between an 
organization’s consistency in its approach to the three domains and their ultimate 
strategic archetype.  The strength of the association is considered strong as measured by 
Cramer’s V (φc = .469) (Green, Salkind, & Akey, 2011).  Additionally, the results for the 
Pearson χ2 (3, N = 503) = 110.86, p = .000 further indicate a statistically significant 
association for those organizations who are pure in their approach to the three domains 
and their strategic archetype.  These findings support hypothesis 4a. 
Hypothesis 4b proposed that organizations where the domains consistently align 
with their respective strategic archetype will outperform those organizations where the 
domains do not align. With this hypothesis, multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was used to test differences in means between two independent variables 
across four continuous dependent variables.  Specifically, the independent variables 
encompassed the domain orientation of the organization, broken into two groups; pure 
and random.  These variables are hypothesized to differentially effect organizational 
performance (i.e., sales, market share, ROE and ROA).  Four control variables were 
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initially included in the analysis – size, age, industry, and structure. Only the significant 
variables, size and age, were retained in the final analysis. 
Descriptive statistics related to this hypothesis are shown in Table 11. A 
statistically significant Box’s test (F = 8.25; p < .001), indicates that the observed 
covariance matrices of the dependent variable are unequal across the independent 
variable groups.  The Bartlett’s test of sphericity was also statistically significant (χ2 = 
1677.503, p < .01), indicating sufficient correlation between the dependent measures 
(Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2013).  A Pillai’s trace and Hotelling’s Τ2 (two equivalent 
tests of differences; Hair et al., 2010) were employed to evaluate all multivariate effects 
(Meyers et al., 2013).  As shown in Table 12, the composite dependent variate comprised 
of the sales, market share, ROE and ROA,  was significantly affected by domain 
orientation (V = .023 and Τ2 = .024, F(4, 496) = 2.941, p < .05).   
Table 11:  Means and Standard Deviations 
 Pure Random 
Variable M SD M SD 
Sales 4.89 1.45 4.69 1.41 
Market Share 4.78 1.25 4.72 1.26 
ROE 4.72 1.33 4.79 1.35 
ROA 4.76 1.32 4.77 1.31 
 
Table 12:  Multivariate Tests 
 
Effect 
 
Value 
 
F 
Hypothesis  
df 
Error  
df 
 
Sig. 
Partial Eta  
Squared 
Pure 
Domain 
Pillai's Trace .023 2.94 4.00 496 .020 .023 
Hotelling's Trace .024 2.94 4.00 496 .020 .023 
 
Univariate ANOVAs were conducted on each dependent measure to determine 
the locus of the statistically significant multivariate effect.  As shown in Table 13, neither 
ROE nor ROA were significant at less than .05, but both sales and market share are 
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significant (F = 8.75, p < .05 and F = 5.33, p < .05 respectively).  While not significant at 
less than .05, ROA was significant at less than .10 (F = 2.77, p < .10). 
Table 13:  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
 
 
Source 
 
Dependent  
Variable 
Type III  
Sum of  
Squares 
 
 
df 
 
Mean  
Square 
 
 
F 
 
 
Sig. 
Partial  
Eta  
Squared 
Pure Domain 
Sales 15.46 1 15.46 8.75 .00 .017 
Market Share 6.84 1 6.84 5.33 .02 .011 
ROE 2.51 1 2.51 1.74 .19 .003 
ROA 3.94 1 3.94 2.76 .10 .006 
 
This conclusion was further supported by an examination of the coefficient for the 
linear combinations. As shown in Table 14, sales and market share contribute most to 
distinguishing between those organizations with a pure domain and those that are 
random.  In particular, sales (β = -.395, p < .01, multivariate η2 = .02) and market share (β 
= -.263, p < .01, multivariate η2 = .01) contributed statistically significantly toward 
discriminating a random domain from a pure domain.  As previously discussed, ROA 
was also significant at the less than .10 level (β = -.200, p < .10, multivariate η2 = .01). It 
is noted that these two variables exhibit a small effect size, a topic discussed in greater 
depth later in the paper.  Taken in its entirety, the findings partially support hypothesis 
4b. 
The final hypothesis (Hypothesis 4c) in this series proposed that organizations 
that do not fall firmly into either the prospector or defender strategic archetype would be 
ambidextrous because they exhibit some combination of archetypes. An examination of 
both the analyzer and reactor strategic archetypes as presented in Table 15 shows that 201 
companies in the sample were classified as Analyzers and 233 as Reactors.  Further 
examination of the two archetypes reveals that of the 201 Analyzers, 9 can be viewed as 
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Analyzers with a Prospector tendency and 69 with a Defender tendency.  The remaining 
123 companies exhibited a pure Analyzer archetype.  This latter group of organizations 
was ones whose assignment landed on the 45
o
 diagonal between the two axes of 
explorative and exploitative orientations.  Examination of the Reactor archetype shows 
that only 3 of these organizations exhibit a tendency towards the Defender archetype.   
Another 3 Reactors tended towards the Prospector archetype.  The remaining 221 
companies exhibited a pure Reactor archetype.  
Table 14:  Coefficients for the Linear Combinations 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
 
Parameter 
 
 
B 
 
Std. 
Error 
 
 
t 
 
 
Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
 
Observed 
 Power 
Sales 
Intercept 4.62 .13 36.18 .00 .72 1.00 
Organization’s  
Age 
-.01 .00 -2.37 .02 .01 .66 
Organization’s 
Size 
.65 .08 8.44 .00 .13 1.00 
Pure Domain -.40 .13 -2.96 .00 .02 .84 
        
Market Share 
Intercept 4.48 .11 41.21 .00 .77 1.00 
Organization’s  
Age 
-.01 .00 -3.14 .00 .02 .88 
Organization’s 
Size 
.70 .07 10.69 .00 .19 1.00 
Pure Domain -.26 .11 -2.31 .02 .01 .64 
        
ROE 
Intercept 4.36 .12 37.88 .00 .74 1.00 
Organization’s  
Age 
-.01 .00 -2.97 .00 .02 .84 
Organization’s 
Size 
.78 .07 11.21 .00 .20 1.00 
Pure Domain -.16 .12 -1.32 .19 .00 .26 
        
ROA Intercept 4.43 .11 38.74 .00 .75 1.00 
 
Organization’s  
Age 
-.01 .00 -2.68 .01 .01 .76 
Organization’s 
Size 
.709 .069 10.33 .000 .176 1.00 
Pure Domain -.200 .120 -1.66 .097 .006 .38 
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Table 15:  Analysis of Analyzer & Reactor Archetypes 
 
Strategic Archetype 
 
Frequency 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Prospector / Analyzer 9 4.5 
Analyzer 123 65.7 
Analyzer / Defender 69 100.0 
Total 201  
Defender / Reactor 3 1.3 
Reactor 227 98.7 
Reactor / Prospector 3 100 
Total 233  
 
While the majority of the hypotheses were supported, there were a few results 
where the effect size was small, suggesting minimal practical significance of these 
specific findings.  However, it is also possible that the effect size is a function of other 
factors in the study.  For example and consistent with Cohen’s (1988) caution on range 
restrictions, Breaugh (2003) noted that in the case of dichotomous variables, the 
maximum point-biserial correlation cannot be 1.00, but rather will fall somewhere 
between .80 and .27 (50-50 group split to 99-1 group split respectively). This in turn, has 
an influence on the extent to which a strong effect size will be reported. He also argued 
that categorical data (relative to continuous data) can also result in an underestimation of 
the strength of the relationship between variables. Other research has also pointed out that 
effect size is just one side of the same coin. It complements, but does not replace a 
statistically significant association between variables or groups (Fan, 2001). 
To better understand the relationship between variables in a study, an odds ratio 
can be a useful addition to the reported effect size. To calculate the odds ratio related to 
hypotheses 4b, the two significant performance measures, sales and market share, were 
each divided into three conditions (high, medium, and low) using a mean split based on 
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the information provided in Table 11. Groups were then created using these three 
performance conditions and the two domain orientations (pure and random). Next, 
relative odds ratios were calculated using the formula (nc1/nr1)/(nc2/nr2), where c = column 
and r = row. The results from this set of calculations are presented in Tables 16 (detailed 
calculations available upon request). 
Table 16:  Relative Odds Ratios 
 Pure Random Odds Ratio 
Sales    
     High n  = 23 n  = 61 .27/.73 = .37 
     Moderate  n  = 95 n  = 267 .26/.74 = .35 
     Low  n  = 24 n  = 33 .42/.58 = .72 
Market Share    
     High  n  = 14 n  = 44 .24/.76 = .32 
     Moderate  n  = 81 n  = 213 .28/.73 = .38 
     Low  n  = 47 n  = 104 .31/.69 = .45 
 
The association between firm performance and domain orientation was examined 
by calculating an odds ratio for two conditions at a time (Breaugh, 2003). Accordingly, 
the odds ratio for high sales versus moderate sales is 1.05 (i.e., .37/.35), for high sales 
versus low sales is .51, and for moderate sales and low sales is 49.  Likewise, the odds 
ratio for high market share versus moderate market share is .84, for high market share 
versus low market share is .71, and for moderate market share and low market share is 
.84.   
When interpreting the ratios, Haddock, Rindskopf, and Shadish (1998, p. 342) 
stated, “as general rules of thumb, odds ratios close to 1.0 represent a weak relationship 
between variables, whereas odds ratios over 3.0 for positive associations (less than one-
third for negative associations) indicate strong relationships.” Based on this rule, the 
strength of the relationship between orientation domain and firm performance, 
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particularly for sales, while weak, is probably a bit stronger (i.e., closer to moderate) than 
indicted by the effect size alone. 
Because Hypotheses 5a through 5d considered the relation of each of the 
identified problem domains on the strategic archetypes entailed a single categorical 
dependent variable (DV), with four groups, and a single predictor or independent variable 
(IV) measured on a continuous scale, Hair et al (2010) suggest the use of standard 
multinomial logistic regression as being appropriate in these instances.  In keeping with 
this suggestion, Reactor archetype was used as the reference category. In addition, while 
all four control variables were initially included in the analyses, only the significant 
variable, size, is included in the final model.   
Hypothesis 5a considered the relationship of the entrepreneurial problem domain 
on the strategic archetypes.  As discussed, the entrepreneurial problem domain focuses on 
the extent to which the organization seeks to exploit existing products or markets as well 
as explore new opportunities for products and markets.  Following the work of Cao et al 
(2009), each of the three problem domains can be expressed as integrative constructs.  In 
the case of the entrepreneurial problem domain, the measures of exploration and 
exploitation are integrated into the single construct. The balanced dimension (BD) 
approach (Cao et al, 2009; He & Wong, 2004) utilizes the absolute difference between 
exploration and exploitation, was used in this test.  The balanced dimension was utilized 
in keeping with the opinion expressed by Cao et al’s (2009) that it provides for a clearer 
representation of the relative position of exploratory and exploitative activities to each 
other.  That such a balance contributes to an organization’s ability to control performance 
related risks and by extension performance.  To further facilitate the interpretation, and 
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following Cao et al’s (2009), the resulting difference score was subtracted from 5, such 
that a higher value represented a greater balance between exploration and exploitation. 
Results of the multinomial logistic regression indicate that the predictor is 
statistically significant.  The -2 Log Likelihood measure utilized in logistic regression is 
comparable to the F test utilized in multiple regression.  In this analysis, -2 Log 
Likelihood = 63.56, χ2 (3, N=503) = 104.394, p < .001.  A statistically significant -2 Log 
Likelihood for the base model that is smaller than the intercept only (i.e., 63.056 versus 
167.450) is indicative of a better model fit.  Examination of the Nagelkerke pseudo R
2
 
(.213), indicates that the model accounts for approximately 21% of the total variance. 
The prediction success for the cases used in developing the model is modest, with 
an overall prediction success of 49.7% and correct prediction rates of 0%, 62.7%, 27.1% 
and 46.7% for the Prospector, Analyzer, Defender and Reactor respectively, table 17.  As 
in earlier tests, Press’s Q was calculated in order to take into account chance agreement in 
the predictive ability of the model.  A value of 163.69 exceeding the minimum threshold 
of 6.63 (χ2 at .01 significant level).  
Table 17:  Frequency of Predictor Variables 
 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
 
Prospector 
 
Analyzer 
 
Defender 
 
Reactor 
Percent 
Correct 
Prospector 0 2 1 7 0.0% 
Analyzer 0 126 2 73 62.7% 
Defender 0 5 16 38 27.1% 
Reactor 0 116 9 108 46.4% 
Overall Percentage 0.0% 9.5% 5.6% 44.9% 49.7% 
 
The regression coefficients (β), the Wald test (which is the equivalent to a t-test in 
multiple regression), the adjusted odds ratio [Exp (β)], and the 95% confidence intervals 
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(CI) for the odds ratio are presented for each of the three models in Table 18.  In the first 
model the β indicates that for every unit of increase in the entrepreneurial domain, 
organizations are 71% less likely to adopt a Prospector’s archetype over a Reactor.  This 
is supported with a significant Wald statistic of 4.96 (p < .05).  The Analyzer, on the 
other hand is 42% more likely to be chosen (Wald = 9.73, p < .05) and the Defender is 
121% less likely to be chosen (Wald = 51.48, p < .00). These combined results provide 
support for hypothesis 5a; the entrepreneurial domain is related to the organization’s 
strategic archetype. 
Hypothesis 5b posits that the predictive effect of the entrepreneurial problem on 
the organization’s strategic archetype is mediated by the engineering problem.  When one 
or more of the dependent variables in the mediation analysis is categorical, as is the case 
with strategic archetype, MacKinnon (2007, Chap. 11) suggests that logistic regression be 
utilized because the categorical dependent variable violates several assumptions of 
ordinary regression.  However, because the relationship between the independent variable 
and the mediator are continuous, it is important to note that this specific relationship was 
examined using linear regression.   
Table 18:  Parameter Estimates 
 
 
 
 
Strategic 
Archetype 
 
 
 
β 
 
 
Std. 
Error 
 
 
 
Wald 
 
 
 
d.f 
 
 
 
Sig. 
 
 
 
Exp(β) 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Exp(β) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Prospector 
Intercept -.29 1.24 .05 1 .82    
Entrepreneurial 
Domain -.71 .32 4.96 1 .03 
 
.49 
 
.26 
 
.92 
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Strategic 
Archetype 
 
 
 
β 
 
 
Std. 
Error 
 
 
 
Wald 
 
 
 
d.f 
 
 
 
Sig. 
 
 
 
Exp(β) 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for 
Exp(β) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Analyzer 
Intercept -2.01 .61 10.93 1 .00    
Entrepreneurial 
Domain .42 .14 9.73 1 .00 
 
1.53 
 
1.17 
 
1.99 
          
Defender 
Intercept 3.20 .65 26.15 1 .00    
Entrepreneurial 
Domain -1.21 .11 51.48 1 .00 
 
.30 
 
.21 
 
.41 
 
To test for mediation Baron and Kenny (1986) recommend that the researcher 
follows a three step process.  First; regress the independent variable on the mediator 
variable.  Second regress the dependent variable on the independent variable.  Thirdly, 
regress the dependent variable on both the independent variable and on the mediator.  It is 
expected that when mediation occurs, the nature of the unmediated relationship between 
the independent and dependent variable changes.  If full mediation occurs, the significant 
effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable disappears with the 
significant effect of the independent variable carried between the mediator and the 
dependent variable.  In the case of partial mediation, the significant effect between the 
independent variable and the dependent variable remains, but is reduced. 
Table 19 shows the results of testing for mediation. Specifically, the inclusion of 
the entrepreneurial problem in the model is significant (F = 45.49, p < .00) and the 
adjusted R
2
 (.08) explains just the significant control variable, company size. Moreover, 
the relationship between the entrepreneurial problem (independent variable) and the 
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engineering problem (mediator variable) is significant (b = .31, p < .00), thereby meeting 
the first condition of mediation. 
Table 19:  Test of Mediating Effect of the Engineering Domain on the Relationship 
Between the Entrepreneurial Problem and Strategic Archetype 
        
  Mediator Dependent 
  (Engineering Domain) (Prospector) 
Step Independent b   Adj. R
2
 F  b  
1 Company Size .28 (.05)**  .16 46.56**   
 Entrepreneurial Domain .31 (.05)**      
        
2 Company Size      1.20 (.54)** 
 Entrepreneurial Domain      -.88 (.33)** 
3 Company Size      1.62 (.59)** 
 Engineering Domain      -.95 (.29)** 
 Entrepreneurial Domain      9.64 (.33)** 
        
      (Analyzer) 
       b  
        
2 Company Size      -.19 (.11)** 
 Entrepreneurial Domain      -.46 (.14)** 
3 Company Size      -.27 (.12) *   
 Engineering Domain      .31 (.12)** 
 Entrepreneurial Domain      .43 (14)** 
        
      (Defender) 
       b  
        
2 Company Size      -.79 (.23)** 
 Entrepreneurial Domain      -1.00 (.17)** 
3 Company Size      -.49 (.25) * 
 Engineering Domain      -.79 (.16)** 
 Entrepreneurial Domain      -.99 (.18)** 
N=503; Unstandardized coefficients reported with standard error in parenthesis 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
 
The results of the logistic regression that contain steps 2 and 3 (Baron & Kenny, 
1986) are shown in Table 19. Supporting step 2 in the test of mediation, findings 
demonstrate that the entrepreneurial problem had a significant effect on the Prospector 
archetype (b = -.88, p < .00), the Analyzer archetype (b = -.46, p < .00), and the Defender 
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archetype (b = -1.10, p < .00). With the inclusion of the mediator (the engineering 
problem) the significance of the coefficient for the Prospector decreased (b = -.95, p = 
.05), as it also did for the Analyzer (b = .31, p < .00), and the Defender (b = -.79, p < .00).  In 
total, the effect of the entrepreneurial problem is reduced by still maintains a significant 
on strategic archetypes with the engineering problem included in the model, thereby 
demonstrating a partially mediated relationship.   
Hypotheses 5c and 5d considered whether the effect of the entrepreneurial 
problem and the engineering problem respectively on the organization’s strategic 
archetype depended upon the influence of the administrative problem.  Specifically, 
hypothesis 5c explores whether the relationship between the entrepreneurial problem and 
the strategic archetypes varies with different levels of the administrative problem.  
Similarly, hypothesis 5d examines whether the relationship between the engineering 
problem and the strategic archetypes is dependent on the levels of the administrative 
problem. 
Keeping with the approach suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986), three steps 
were needed to determine if an interaction exists.  The first step establishes the base 
model and examines the relation between the independent variable (entrepreneurial 
problem for hypothesis 5c and engineering problem for hypothesis 5d) and the outcome 
variable (strategic archetype).  The second step involves the inclusion of the second 
variable, the moderator (administrative problem), into the model.  The third step 
examines the strength of the interaction, if any, between the two variables and the 
outcome. The interaction terms were created by multiplying the entrepreneurial problem 
by the administrative problem for 5c, and the engineering problem by the administrative 
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problem for 5d.  Prior to implementing each of the aforementioned steps all predictor 
variables were mean centered to reduce the possible effect of multicollinearity. 
As noted above, hypothesis 5c considers the interaction between the 
entrepreneurial and administrative problems.  Table 20 presents the result of the steps in 
testing for the existence of a moderation effect. Findings indicate that the model 
examining the relationship between the entrepreneurial problem and the strategic 
archetypes is significant (χ2 = 91.65, p < .000) as is each of the specific archetypes. 
Table 20:  Results of Entrepreneurial x Administration Interaction 
 Model 1 
 Prospector Analyzer Defender 
 
Variables  B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error 
Control variables       
Company Size 1.20 (.54) -.19 (.11) -.79 (.23) 
Predictors       
Entrepreneurial       
Administrative       
Interaction Terms       
Entrepreneurial X 
Administration       
Constant -1.23 (1.40) -2.01 (.61) 3.29 (.64) 
       
LRχ2 91.65**      
Log-likelihood 247.35      
Likelihood ratio test   62.76      
 Model 2 
 Prospector Analyzer Defender 
 
Variables B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error 
Control variables       
Company Size 1.12 (.56) -.07 (.13) -1.01 (.29) 
Predictors       
Entrepreneurial -.96 (.34) .50 (.14) -1.23 (.19) 
Administrative -.17 (.23) .18 (.07) -.38 (.12) 
Interaction Terms       
Entrepreneurial X 
Administration       
Constant -.31 (1.79) -2.85 (.70) 5.07 (.91) 
       
LRχ2 20.83**      
Log-likelihood 488.93      
Likelihood ratio test 77.90**      
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 Model 3 
 Prospector Analyzer Defender 
 
Variables  B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error 
Control variables       
Company Size 1.13 (.57) -.07 (.13) -1.01 (.25) 
Predictors       
Entrepreneurial -1.06 (.35) .48 (.14) -1.37 (.21) 
Administrative -.28 (.25) .16 (.08) -.46 (.13) 
Interaction Terms       
Entrepreneurial X 
Administration 
.05 (.06) .01 (.02) .08 (.04) 
Constant .46 (1.87) -2.71 (.76) 5.91 (1.04) 
       
LRχ2     5.62      
Log-likelihood 842.77      
Likelihood ratio test   78.66      
The reference category is:  Reactor:  Unstandardized coefficients reported; 
 * p <.05, **p <.01 
 
Model 2 with the moderator included is also significant (χ2 = 20.83, p < .00). With 
respect to each individual strategic archetype, the moderator is not significantly related to 
the Prospector archetype (b = -.17, p = ns), but it was significant with the Analyzer (b = 
.18, p < .05), and Defender (b = -.38, p < .00) archetypes. 
Model 3 presents the interaction effect.  Not only is the model with this 
interaction not significant (χ2 = 5.62, p = ns), but so too is the interaction effect on the 
Prospector (b = .05, p = ns) and the Analyzer (b = .01, p = ns). While the interaction 
effect on the Defender is significant (b = .08, p < .05), the model itself, as noted, is non-
significant. Thus, hypothesis 5c is not supported. 
A similar procedure was followed to examine hypothesis 5d. Table 21 presents 
the result of testing for the existence of a moderation effect.  The findings indicate that 
the model examining the relationship between the engineering problem and the strategic 
archetypes is significant (χ2= 82.90, p <.00) as are each of the specific archetypes.  Table 
21 present the results from the second step where the moderator variable, administrative 
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problem, is entered into the equation.  Again, as in 5c the model with the moderator 
included is significant (χ2 = 13.67, p <.05).  With respect to each individual strategic 
archetype, the moderator was not significantly related to the Prospector archetype (b = -
.19, p = ns), but it was significant with respect to the Analyzer (b = .17, p < .05) and 
Defender (b = -.24, p < .05) archetypes.  Finally, Table 21 presents the results from the 
third step where the interaction term is entered into the equation.  Not only is the model 
with this interaction not significant (χ2 = 5.21, p = ns.), but so too is the interaction effect 
on the Prospector (b = -.18, p = ns) and the Defender (b = -.21, p = ns).  While the 
interaction effect on the Analyzer is significant (b = .25, p < .05), the model itself is non-
significant.  Hypothesis 5d is therefore not supported either. 
Table 21:  Results of Engineering x Administration Interaction 
 Model 1 
 Prospector Analyzer Defender 
 
Variables 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Control variables       
Company Size 1.51 (.58) -.21 (.12) -.66 (.23) 
Predictors       
Engineering       
Administrative       
Interaction Terms       
Engineering X 
Administration       
Constant -1.29 (1.11) -1.52 (.50) 2.05 (.49) 
       
LRχ2 82.90**      
Log-likelihood 336.21      
Likelihood ratio test       
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 Model 2 
 Prospector Analyzer Defender 
 
Variables 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Control variables       
Company Size 1.43 (.60) -.09 (.13) -.81 (.25) 
Predictors       
Engineering 1.09 (.29) .40 (.12) -.86 (.15) 
Administrative -.19 (.23) .17 (.07) -.24 (.12) 
Interaction Terms       
Engineering X 
Administration       
Constant -.52 (1.40) -2.33 (.61) 2.94 (.70) 
       
LRχ2 13.67*      
Log-likelihood 510.40      
Likelihood ratio test 53.19**      
 Model 3 
 Prospector Analyzer Defender 
 
Variables 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
 
B 
Std. 
Error 
Control variables       
Company Size 1.46 (.60) -.05 (.13) -.80 (.25) 
Predictors       
Engineering -1.01 (.29) .41 (.12) -.86 (.15) 
Administrative -.18 (.22) .25 (.08) -.21 (.12) 
Interaction Terms       
Engineering X 
Administration 
.01 (.04) -.04 (.02) -.02 (.02) 
Constant .56 (1.37) -2.62 (.63) 2.86 (.70) 
       
LRχ2 5.21      
Log-likelihood 852.64      
Likelihood ratio test 55.15**      
The reference category is:  Reactor:  Unstandardized coefficients reported;  
 * p <.05, **p <.01 
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CHAPTER 6:  DISCUSSION  
 
This study re-examines the original Miles and Snow (1978) typology utilizing the 
lenses of dynamic capabilities with an emphasis on ambidexterity.  In their original work, 
Miles and Snow (1978) laid the foundation for the concept of strategic equifinality.  The 
basic tenet of which, is that within any particular industry or environment, there is more 
than one way to succeed.  However, they also stressed that the options are not endless.  
Rather, there are a few basic patterns (i.e., strategic profiles) that organizations can adopt 
that facilitate the accomplishment of their goals. 
The inclusion of the lenses of dynamic capabilities and ambidexterity precisely 
builds upon the concept of equifinality by aiding in the identification of the patterns.  
These lenses contribute to the recognition of the patterns identified by Miles and Snow 
(1978) as the Prospector, Analyzer, Defender and Reactor.  This study sought to 
contribute to both the scholarly and practitioner literatures by developing a deeper 
understanding of those strategic archetypes.  By extension, the additional insights 
provided by the lenses of dynamic capabilities and ambidexterity also contribute to our 
understanding of the drivers of sustained competitive advantage. 
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This study contributes to extant literature in five interrelated ways. First, a 
contemporary examination of Miles and Snow’s (1978) work is offered 35 years after 
they first presented their findings.  Second, the original work of Miles and Snow (1978) 
is extended through the application of the lenses of dynamic capabilities and 
ambidexterity.  Third, the scope of the original study is expanded to a larger 
heterogeneous sample.  Fourth, in applying the lenses of dynamic capabilities and 
ambidexterity, this study enhances our understanding of how the Analyzer, as identified 
by Miles and Snow (1978) may be the more appropriate of the four strategic archetypes 
for an organization’s survival and competitive advantage in the current economic 
environment.  Finally, the three domain problems (entrepreneurial, engineering and 
administrative) identified by Miles and Snow (1978) are shown to align and interact in 
influencing and positioning an organization’s strategic archetype. 
The empirical analysis for this study, based on responses from 503 US-based 
organizations across multiple industries, provides support for most hypotheses.  The 
composition of the sample, while somewhat biased toward smaller, privately held 
organizations, does provide for a fairly heterogeneous mixture of companies.  As such, 
the findings from this study should be of relevance to a general constituency. 
In general, the analysis demonstrates that Miles and Snow’s (1978) typology still 
has relevance, and therefore has withstood the test of time.  It should be noted however, 
that there are significant differences between the original work and the findings in this 
dissertation.  Findings that do not lessen the importance of their research, but rather 
complement and extend it in meaningful ways.   
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The first sets of hypotheses, 1a through 3d, examine the various orientations or 
attributes of the organization as a predictor of the organization’s strategic archetype.  The 
specific attributes include an explorative and exploitative orientation, the proclivity 
towards radical or incremental innovation, and adaptability or alignment. The orthogonal 
nature of these attributes recognizes that each pair coexists simultaneously and in 
potentially differing degrees; an idea that is in alignment with both the concepts of 
dynamic capabilities and ambidexterity. 
 The orthogonal pairing of the attributes is, as noted, in keeping with what 
constitutes ambidexterity.  Researchers and practitioners increasingly use the notion of 
ambidexterity to describe organizations that are capable of both exploitative and 
explorative behaviors and/or strategic acts (Simsek et al., (2009).   
Considering the first pairing between the exploitative and explorative attributes, 
the current study shows that when both attributes exist in relatively high and equal 
amounts, in essence ambidextrous behavior, the organization is classified as being an 
Analyzer; a finding consistent with Miles and Snow’s (1978) characterization of an 
Analyzer.  Conversely, organizations where the same attributes exist in equal and 
relatively low amounts are classified as Reactors.  Hence, the earlier ‘different faces of 
the same coin’ or Janus – affect postulate.  The findings are also consistent with the 
pendulum analogy, whereby the pendulum firmly swings in the direction of exploration 
for the Prospector and for the Defender, the pendulum firmly swings toward exploitation.  
The second pairing examines the organizations orientation towards innovation.  
Similar to hypotheses 1a-d, the results for hypotheses 2a-d reveal that those organizations 
pursuing both radical and incremental innovation at relatively high and equal levels are 
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identifiable as Analyzers.  Again, the converse situation of a low orientation for both 
attributes results in an organization being identified as a Reactor.  Those organizations 
with an emphasis on radical innovation identify as Prospectors while those orientated 
within the world of incremental innovation are Defenders. 
The third, and final pairing, examines structure and culture along the attributes of 
alignment and adaptability.  Alignment focuses on the organization’s efforts to reduce 
uncertainty through cohesiveness of activities, competencies, and goals while adaptability 
helps the organization respond to changes in its environment and explore new 
opportunities (Gibson & Birkinshaw, (2004).  In keeping with Brown and Eisenhardt 
(1997) and Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) Analyzers, once again, exhibited an 
ambidextrous propensity towards actively displaying high levels of both alignment and 
adaptability.  When these attributes presented themselves on the low end, the Reactor was 
the strategic archetype most commonly identified.  Finally, the Prospector was largely 
oriented towards adaptability while the Defender exhibited a high level of alignment. 
The next set of hypotheses, 4a and 4b, examined consistency in problem domains 
and how that consistency, when it exists, affects the organization’s financial performance.    
The results of hypothesis 4a divided the sample of organizations into one of two distinct 
groups – random and pure.  Hypothesis 4b, extend the results of 4a by examining what 
effect, if any, consistency in the strategic archetype has on the organization’s 
performance.  Findings generally supported the hypothesis.  
Organizations identified as pure did outperform their random counterparts in sales 
and market share.  The lack of significance between the two groups on ROA and ROE is 
less a function of their specific differences and most likely a result of the current 
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economic environment.  In response to the recession the U.S. government has enacted 
policies and taken actions (or not) that many feel have contributed to a general business 
climate rife with uncertainty.  To a large extent, this has led to what the popular press has 
reported as “businesses and their capital sitting on the sidelines” rather than investing in 
expansion; with cash sitting at the highest level in over half a century ((Lahart).  
Similarly, Fortune Magazine reported that “economic uncertainty, especially policy 
uncertainty, is greater than it has been…” and “business leaders were most uncertain 
about tax and regulatory issues: (Colvin).  The culmination of these forces may account 
for the lack of between group differences for ROA and ROE given that there is very little 
return on money [assets] during this period.       
Examination of strategic archetypes in the context of hypothesis 4c shows a 
preponderance of organizations classified as either Analyzers or Reactors.  This finding 
suggests that there is value in possessing a mixed orientation (or moving toward a mixed 
orientation).  This is not particularly surprising in light of not only current economic 
conditions, but also the present-day competitive environment exemplified by 
hypercompetition and great uncertainty.  In fact, research may ultimately come to find 
that the Analyzer, and potentially the Reactor, are the odds on favorite for survival and 
sustained success. 
The last set of hypotheses, 5a through d, take a look at one of the most enduring 
points of discussion in the management and strategy literature, the relationship between 
structure and strategy. Overlaying the strategic coalignment paradigm (Veliyath & 
Srinivasan, (1995) with the problem domains presented by Miles and Snow (1978) allows 
for an examination of the strategy-structure debate.   
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The entrepreneurial problem establishes how the organization interacts with the 
external environment (exploring new opportunities and/or exploiting existing capabilities 
and competencies). Findings clearly indicated the existence of a significant relationship 
between the organization’s entrepreneurial domain and its strategic archetype. The 
engineering problem provides for the means by which the organization attempts to 
address the entrepreneurial problem (via radical innovative and/or incremental 
innovation).  This study found that the engineering problem partially mediated the 
relationship between the entrepreneurial domain and strategic archetype thereby 
suggesting that while the engineering problem is important; its role is tempered by other 
factors.  
Finally, the study considered the role, if any, that the administrative problem has 
on the interactions of either the relationship of the entrepreneurial problem on the 
organization’s strategic archetype, or the relationship between the engineering problem 
and the strategic archetype. Hypothesis 5c and 5d seek to ascertain, to what extent if any, 
the influence of the administrative problem has on the organization’s strategic archetype.  
The study failed to support the final interaction between the engineering problem and 
strategic archetype. This lack of support may be attributable to the fact that many of the 
sample organizations were Reactors, which as postulated previously, may be immature 
Analyzers.  This may further be supported by the earlier discussion regarding the impact 
of dynamic capabilities, ambidexterity, and organizational vacillation.  That as a result of 
these factors, with a particular eye towards vacillation, the administrative problem may 
not yet be fully formed, or may lag in its development, and therefore its impact.  The 
large number of both Analyzers and Reactors in the sample, both posited as examples of 
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organizational vacillation, could account for the apparent lack of any observable 
significance within this hypothesis. 
To better understand how the differences between studies support the continued 
relevance of their work, it is important to highlight key features delineating the two.  The 
first difference between the Miles and Snow study and the current study was that their 
research was more qualitative in design, and entailed interviewing high level executives 
in each of the companies and corresponding industries they examined, e.g. text book 
publishers, hospitals, electron and food processing.  Not only was their study more 
qualitative, it also comprised a total of 84 organizations, while this study, given its 
quantitative design, examined 503 organizations.  Additionally, of the 84 organizations in 
the original studies, only 47 were actually classified into one of the four strategic 
archetypes, they elected not to classify the remaining 37 (see Table 22).  In the current 
study, all organizations were subject to classification. 
Table 22:  Miles and Snow Original Distribution 
 Text Book 
Publishers 
Electronic Firms & 
Food Processors 
 
Hospitals 
 
Totals 
# of firms in original study 16 49 19 84 
# of firms actually used 5 24 19 48 
Strategic Archetype 
Distribution 
 
 
   
    Prospector 2 5 4 11 
    Analyzer 1 15 5 21 
    Defender 1 2 6 9 
    Reactor 1 2 4 7 
 
A further potential confounding factor of their research was that each of the three 
studies was conducted by a different member of the team at a different point in time, 
often separated by months.  Charles Snow examined the college textbook publishing 
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companies, Henry J. Coleman examined the food processing and electronics companies, 
and Alan D. Meyer examined the hospitals (2003). 
The rational they provided for only studying one industry, even though Coleman 
conducted two separate sets of the interviews was their belief that to study more than one 
simultaneously would confound management’s perceptions to the objective measures of 
the environment.  They posited that a sample including different types of organizations 
would result in contaminated measures and inaccurate interpretation of influences of both 
the environment and the organization.  However, it was also their contention that it was 
necessary to examine industries that were undergoing some amount of market change 
because such change produced greater uncertainty, and as a result provided some 
diversity in managerial perception (Miles & Snow, 2003).  In reality, it is possible that 
this design then limited the generalizability of their work.  The current study as clearly 
detailed earlier, does not adopt a similar research design and thus, is expected to have 
greater external validity (i.e., generalizability). 
Second and possibly foremost, Miles and Snow’s (1978) study was conducted in a 
different economic and competitive environment.  The general environment at the time of 
their study (mid to late 1970’s) was one of arguably far less competition.  Many 
industries, while not necessarily the ones that Miles and Snow (1978) examine, were 
oligarchical, and some where even monopolistic.  The rate of change within and between 
industries and their constituents was far less frantic.  The industrial base of the country, 
while beginning to change, was still very much rooted in manufacturing.  Information 
technology and technology in general, was just beginning to have an impact on 
organizational functioning and performance.  Globalization was in a very early stage of 
119 
 
 
development. In sum, competitive conditions were rather simplistic and easy to navigate 
compared to today.  
The environment in which the current study was conducted is often characterized 
as hypercompetitive, an environment typified by intense and rapid competitive moves 
and great uncertainty; an environment in which competitors move quickly to build 
advantage and erode the advantages of rivals (D’Aveni, (1994 p. 217-218).  It was 
Schumpeter (1934) who first hinted at the concept of hypercompetiveness when 
discussing the concept of creative destruction.  Specifically, destruction creates a 
disequilibrium in which most every organization is threatened with extinction as soon as 
it comes into existence.  In a similar fashion, D’Aveni states, “instead of seeking a 
sustainable advantage, strategy in hypercompetitive environments now focuses on 
developing a set of temporary advantages” (D’Aveni, 1994 p. 7).  Brown and Eisenhardt 
(1998) likewise argued organizations can only achieve success by maintaining a 
continuous stream of temporary advantages when the environment is continuously in 
motion. 
It is in this environment of constant flux where not only do competitors and the 
relationships among them continually change, but the interactions between industries 
constantly evolve.  The industrial base of the country has morphed from the production of 
hard goods, to one dominated by acquisition and dissemination of knowledge, services 
and technology.  Globalization is the new norm with an economy of constant and 
unpredictable change (Ireland & Hitt, (2005), where more often than not changes are 
revolutionary as opposed to evolutionary.  This type of environment not only increases 
uncertainty, ambiguity, and discontinuity, but also and as a result, requires that the 
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organization’s strategic leadership increase the speed and adaptability of the decision 
making processes by which their strategies are formulated and implemented (Ireland & 
Hitt, 2005). 
In addition to the aforementioned differences, this study was further impacted by 
the “Great Recession” that started in late 2007.  This period in the country’s economic 
history is, by many estimates, unprecedented.  It has been accompanied by extreme 
uncertainty on the part of most business leaders.  This uncertainty manifests itself in 
inaction and indecision.  While it is not now known if the conditions brought on by the 
“Great Recession” represent a new normal, it is clear that it has brought about significant 
change in the overall environment.  This change has potentially influenced the current 
study’s findings. 
These very changes in the economic and competitive environment support the use 
of the lenses of dynamic capabilities and ambidexterity to explain and predict an 
organization’s ability to achieve a competitive advantage.  Dynamic capabilities call for 
the development of flexible management capabilities as well as difficult to imitate 
combinations of organizational functional and technological skills (Teece et al., (1997).  
The idea that a competitive advantage requires the exploitation of both internal and 
external firm-specific capabilities as well as developing new ones is supported by 
Penrose (1959), Teece (1997), and Wernerfelt (1984). 
Ambidexterity extends the dynamic capabilities postulate by recognizing the need 
to balance organizational activities between those that exploit existing capabilities and 
those that explore new and emerging ones (Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996).  Similarly, an 
organization’s ability to innovate and/or adapt existing innovations is a form of dynamic 
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capabilities (Helfat et al., (2007) (Tushman & Anderson, 1986) Tushman & Anderson, 
1986), which can be considered a form of ambidexterity that creates a viable means by 
which a competitive advantage, be it sustained (Barney, (1989; 1991), Eisenhardt & 
Martin, (2000) or temporary (D’Aveni et al. (2010) is achieved.   
In keeping with the above, one of the most significant findings in this study is the 
preponderance of both the Analyzer and Reactor archetypes.  In fact, combined, they 
comprise 86% of the responding organizations, compared to 58% for Miles and Snow.  
The previous discussion regarding dynamic capabilities and ambidexterity, particularly as 
it relates to a hypercompetitive economic environment supports the efficacy of the 
Analyzer as the archetype best suited for survival in such an environment.  Recall, an 
experienced Analyzer seeks to maximize potential profits while simultaneously seeking 
to minimize risk and they do this by combining the strengths of both the Prospector and 
the Defender (Miles & Snow, (1978).  Stated differently, successful Analyzers have the 
paradoxical ability to simultaneously manage independent and complementary, yet 
contradictory demands as well as processes of exploration and exploitation 
(Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Duncan, 1976; Smith & Lewis, 2011).  While Miles and 
Snow (2003) used the term in a different context, I feel the successful analyzer exhibits 
Janus–like efforts of being able to simultaneously look in opposite, but complementary, 
directions. 
While the Reactor is often viewed as inconsistent and unstable, Miles and Snow 
(1978), it is merely a less mature or stable form of the Analyzer.  Like the Analyzer, they 
often seek to perform contradictory activities simultaneously.  Their apparent disarray 
may be the result of their migrating between archetypes.  The Reactor, even more than 
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the Analyzer, may represent the transitory phase between the other strategic archetypes, 
what is best known as organizational vacillation (Boumgarden et al., (2012). 
When viewed in the context of hypercompetition, the findings of this study 
therefore reflect the current realities required for an organization to survive long term.  
The Analyzer and the Reactor strategic archetypes, by virtue of their more fluid 
orientation, are better suited to evolve and therefore survive (with notable performance 
differentials between the two).  The Prospectors and Defenders, on the other hand, while 
viewed as more stable and therefore potentially more desirable, may in fact be 
organizations least destined for long term survival because of their apparent rigidity and 
even calcification. 
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CHAPTER 7:  LIMITATION OF FINDINGS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
OPPORTUNITIES 
The current study is not without its limitations. First is the potential for common 
method bias associated with the use of single raters (respondents) from each of the 
participating organizations.  Doty and Glick (Doty & Glick, 1998) point out that 
differences in the cognitive rating processes and perceptions among individuals impact 
their responses.  The only means by which this source of common method bias can be 
overcome is by employing multiple raters.  However, as Doty and Glick (1998)posit, 
common method bias does not necessarily imply that common method bias causes 
divergence between the observed and true relationships (p. 381). 
Given the differences in design and context, it is for example, difficult to directly 
compare this study with Miles and Snow’s (1978) original work.  Granted, while it may 
be of interest to some, directly validating the original typologies was not the purpose of 
this study. 
Another limitation of this study is the composition of the overall sample.  The 
sample is comprised of mostly (but not entirely) smaller, privately held companies, and 
all were domestic, U.S. based companies.  This composition does potentially impact the 
overall generalizability of the findings.  It is only through future study that it will become 
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clear whether results do in fact (as assumed here) apply equally to larger organizations, 
foreign companies, and companies whose stock is traded on a recognized exchange.  
A further limitation is the temporal nature of the study.  This study is cross 
sectional and as a result, captures an organization’s strategic archetype at a specific 
moment in time.  To thoroughly understand the influential role of dynamic capabilities, 
ambidexterity and organizational vacillation, it will be important for future research to 
use a longitudinal design; one that captures the fluid rather than immutable nature of 
organizations.   
The study could also be limited because of the economic and competitive context 
in which it occurred. One cannot but wonder what, if anything would change in the 
findings once a more stable environment is reestablished.  For this reason it could provide 
an interesting basis for examining the impact of environmental uncertainty by 
redeploying the survey during a more stable time.   
Aside from the future research that stems from the study’s limitations, other areas 
for study present themselves upon reflection of what this study did and did not reveal.  
One area of inquiry is which of the following four identified attributes; exploration, 
exploitation, radical or incremental innovation, has the most significant impact upon 
organization performance.  Does only one rise above the others, or is there some 
combination or configuration that proves more significant? 
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CHAPTER 8:  CONCLUSION 
This study sought to re-examine the validity of the Miles and Snow strategic 
typology 35 years after it was first published.  The lenses of dynamic capabilities and 
ambidexterity were added in an attempt to extend the explanatory prowess of the 
typology.  This unique perspective, the addition of these frameworks, helps transform the 
initial study so that current economic and competitive conditions can be factored in.  The 
intent is to upgrade the basis of the original study so that it would account for the 
dynamics of the current environment.  This modernized take then extends the 
applicability of the typology into the future. 
Overall, the findings support the typologies validity in the 21
st
 century.  As such, 
it still has utility for both research and practice as a vehicle for describing and 
understanding the strategic orientation [archetype] of an organization.  Also, this study 
demonstrates an increase in explanatory ability brought about by the inclusion and 
consideration of both dynamic capabilities and ambidexterity.  
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Survey Instrument 
Survey Consent:   
Thank you for your participation in this study.  Your participation is completely 
voluntary.  Refusal to participate involves no penalty or loss of benefits to which the 
participant is otherwise entitled and the participant may discontinue participation at any 
time without penalty or loss of benefits, to which the participant is otherwise entitled.  In 
participating you will be assisting in research to better understand the dynamics of an 
organization's strategic intent and orientation.  Your responses will remain completely 
confidential, and will only be analyzed in the aggregate for academic research 
purposes.  In continuing this survey, you acknowledge that you are at least 18 years of 
age and wish to participate in this study conducted by Mr. Sollosy.   
All data collected will be handled in an anonymous manner and Internet Protocol 
addresses will not be collected by the survey program.  The information collected will be 
stored on a secure server and will be downloaded and removed shortly after data 
collection ends.  There is no right or wrong answer and I have no particular interest in 
how a particular individual responds to these questions.   
In this study you will be asked a series of questions about your knowledge and 
perceptions related to your organization's strategic orientation and the alignment of 
various management and operations activities.  The final section includes questions that 
help clarify the industry type, size and other classification aspects of your 
organization.  There is no more risk to you than expressing your opinions in everyday 
conversation.  Your participation will benefit the field of Management, in general, and 
Strategy, specifically.   
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Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried 
out under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board.  This research has been 
approved by the Institutional Review Board at Kennesaw State University.  Questions or 
problems regarding these activities should be addressed to the Institutional Review 
Board, Kennesaw State University, 1000 Chastain Road, #0112, Kennesaw, GA   30144-
5591, (770) 797-2268   
Thank you again for your participation.  Should you have any questions and / or 
wish to review summary findings, please contact me at:  (806) 622-8808.   
 
By clicking YES below, you indicate that you agree to participate in this 
study.  By clicking NO, you are free to exit the survey.  In either regard, I sincerely thank 
you for your time.   
Marc Sollosy,  
Kennesaw State University  
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Q1:  I have read the above statement and agree with the terms listed herein. 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Please answer all questions from the perspective of the Business Unit, (i.e. 
division, etc.) or higher (the Company as a whole),   NOT from a departmental 
level.  Thank you. 
 
Q2:  What is your position in the organization? 
 Executive Level (e.g., Chairman, President, Chief Executive Officer, Chief 
Financial Officer, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Administrative Officer, 
Chief Marketing Officer, Chief Information Officer, and Chief Technology 
Officer) 
 Senior Management (e.g., Vice President, General Manager, Director, etc).  
 Department or Group Manager  
 Other  
 
Q3:  Do you have meaningful involvement in the development of your organization's 
strategy making activities? 
 Yes  
 No  
 
Please indicate the description that best describes your organization.  Please 
answers all questions from the perspective of the Business Unit or higher, not from the 
Department or lower level.  Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
 
Q4:  In comparison to our competitors, the products and services we provide to our 
customers are best described as: 
 More innovative and continually changing.  
 Fairly stable in certain markets while innovative in other markets.  
 Stable and consistently defined throughout the market.  
 In a state of transition, and largely respond to opportunities and threats in the 
marketplace. 
 
Q5:  In contrast to our competitors, our image in the marketplace is that we: 
 Offer fewer selected products which are high in quality.  
 Adopt new ideas and innovations, but only after careful analysis.  
 React to opportunities or threats in the marketplace to maintain or enhance our 
position. 
 Have a reputation for being innovative and creative. 
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Q6:  The amount of time our organization spends monitoring changes and trends in the 
marketplace can best be described as: 
 Lengthy: We are continuously monitoring the marketplace.  
 Minimal: We really don't spend much time monitoring the marketplace.  
 Average: We spend a reasonable amount of time monitoring the marketplace.  
 Sporadic: We sometimes spend a great deal of time, and at other times spend 
little time monitoring the marketplace.  
 
Q7:  The increase or loss in demand for our products or services is primarily due to our 
practice of: 
 Concentrating on more fully developing those markets which we currently 
serve.  
 Responding to the pressures of the marketplace by taking few risks.  
 Aggressively entering into new markets with new types of products or 
services.  
 Assertively penetrating more deeply into markets we currently serve, while 
adopting new products or services after a very careful review of their 
potential.  
 
Q8:  One of the most important goals in our organization is our dedication and 
commitment to: 
 Keep our costs under control. 
 Analyze our costs and revenues carefully, to keep costs under control and 
selectively generate new products or services, or enter new markets.  
 Ensure that the people have the resources and equipment required to develop 
new products, services or enter new markets.  
 Make sure we guard against critical threats by taking any necessary action.  
 
Q9:  The competencies (skills) our management possesses can best be characterized as: 
 Analytical: their skills enable them to both identify trends and then develop 
new products, services or markets.  
 Specialized: their skills are concentrated into one, or a few, specific areas.  
 Broad and entrepreneurial: their skills are diverse, flexible, and enabled to 
change to be creative.  
 Fluid: their skills are related to the near term demands of the marketplace.  
 
Q10:  The one thing that protects us from our competitors is that we are able to: 
 Carefully analyze emerging trends and adopt only those which have proven 
potential. 
 Do a limited number of things exceptionally well.  
 Respond to trends even though they may possess only moderate potential as 
they arise.  
 Consistently develop new products and new markets.  
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Q11:  Our management tends to concentrate on: 
 Maintaining a secure financial condition through cost and quality control.  
 Analyzing opportunities in the marketplace and selecting only those 
opportunities with proven potential, while protecting a secure financial 
position.  
 Activities or business functions which most need attention given the 
opportunities or problems we confront.  
 Developing new products or services and expanding into new markets or 
market segments.  
 
Q12:  We prepare for the future by identifying: 
 The best possible solution to problems or challenges requiring immediate 
attention.  
 Trends and opportunities which can result in the creation of product or service 
offerings that are new to the industry or reach new markets. 
 Problems, which if solved, will maintain and then improve our current product 
or service offerings and market position.  
 Trends in our industry that our competitors have proven possess long term 
potential, while solving problems related to our current product or service 
offerings and customer's needs.  
 
Q13:  Our organizational structure is: 
 Functional in nature (i.e., organized by department - marketing, accounting, 
personnel, etc.).  
 Product or market orientated.  
 Primarily functional (departmental) in nature; however, a product, service or 
market orientated structure does exist in newer or larger product offering 
areas.  
 Continually changing to enable us to meet opportunities and solve problems 
as they arise.  
 
Q14:  The procedures we use to evaluate performance are best described as: 
 Decentralized and participatory; encouraging many organizational members to 
be involved. 
 Heavily orientated towards those reporting requirements which demand 
immediate attention.  
 Highly centralized and primarily the responsibility of senior management.  
 Centralized in established product or service areas, and more participatory in 
new product or service areas.  
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Q15:  Using the scale provided innovation in our organization: 
 Definitely 
True 
1 
   
Definitely 
False 
5 
Introduce new generations of products, services or 
processes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Extend the range of products, services or processes. 1 2 3 4 5 
Expand or open new markets for its products, 
services or processes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Enter into entirely new fields of products, services or 
processes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Improve our existing products, services or processes. 1 2 3 4 5 
Improve the flexibility of our existing products, 
services or processes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Reduce the costs associated with our existing 
products, services or processes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Enhance our position in our existing markets. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q16:  Using the scale provided, over the past three (3) years, our organization sought to:  
 Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
     Strongly 
Agree 
7 
Represents a major improvement over previous 
activities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Represents a breakthrough over previous 
activities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Leads to product or services processes that are 
difficult to replace with older product or service 
processes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Represents a major advance in products, 
services, or processes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Is built upon existing skills. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Is built upon existing experience. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Is built upon existing knowledge. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Leads to products, services or processes whose 
new features build upon existing products, 
services or processes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Leads to products, services or processes whose 
dimensional changes extend from existing 
products, services or processes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Leads to better products, services or processes 
because it improves upon existing products, 
services or processes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Q17:  Using the scale provided, please respond to the following as it best represents your 
organization: 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
     Strongly 
Agree 
7 
The management systems work coherently to 
support the overall objectives of the 
organization. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The management systems cause to waste 
resources on unproductive activities.  
 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The people often end up working at cross 
purposes because our management systems give 
them conflicting objectives. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The management systems encourage people to 
challenge outmoded traditions, practices and 
sacred cows. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The management systems are flexible enough to 
allow us to respond quickly to changes in our 
markets. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The management systems evolve rapidly in 
response to shifts in our business priorities. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Q18:  How many people are employed full time (FTE’s) in your organization? 
 Less than 10  
 10 to 19  
 20 to 49  
 50 to 99  
 100 to 499 
 500 to 999  
 1,000 to 4,999  
 5,000 to 9,999  
 10,000 and more  
 
Q19:  What year was your organization founded? 
 (choices on a drop down menu in a range from pre 1912 to 2012) 
 
Q20:   What is your organization's primary business activity? (This is based upon the 
2012 NAICS codes.  Select only one) 
 11 - Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting  
 21 - Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction  
 22 - Utilities 
 23 - Construction  
 31-33 - Manufacturing  
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 42 - Wholesale Trade  
 44-45 - Retail Trade  
 48-49 - Transportation and Warehousing  
 51 - Information  
 52 - Financial and Insurance  
 53 - Real Estate and Rental and Leasing  
 54 - Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services  
 55 - Management of Companies and Enterprises  
 56 - Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation 
Services 
 61 - Educational Services  
 62 - Health care and Social Services 
 71 - Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation  
 72 - Accommodation and Food Service 
 81 - Other Services (except Public Administration)  
 92 - Public Administration  
 
Q21:  How are the shares of the organizations held? 
 Publicly traded on a recognized public exchange, i.e., NYSE, AMEX, etc. 
 Privately held, shares are not traded on a recognized public exchange 
 
Q22:  Using the provided scale, rate your organization’s performance over the last 36 
months (3 years) in each of the indicated areas: 
 Much 
Worse 
1 
     Much 
Improved 
7 
Sales 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Market Share  2 3 4 5 6 7 
Return on Equity (ROE) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Return on Total Assets (ROA) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Q 23:  From the list below, please indicate the state for the home or primary location of 
this organization. 
 (Drop down selection option with Intentionally Left Blank as an option and all 
50 states and the District of Columbus presented as a selection option) 
 
Thank you for your participation in this study. 
 
 
 
